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PRAGMATIC PATHOLOGIES OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
FRANK B. CROSS*
Agency rulemaking is designed to accomplish certain policy ends,
but most administrative law commentaries focus on the standards
courts apply and analyze those standards from a theoretical,
internal perspective. In this Article, Professor Cross asserts that
administrative law should consider the external, pragmatic
consequences of judicial decisions. When consequences have been
considered in prior research, he contends, the considerations have
been naive and incomplete. Professor Cross argues that the
consequences of judicial review of rulemaking are consistently and
inescapably perverse. The intrinsic nature of judicial review tends
to disrupt and obstruct positive regulatory programs and reduce
the quality of the few rules that agencies do issue. Professor Cross
concludes with a public choice explanation of why powerful
political and private interests perpetuate judicial review, even at the
expense of the public good.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative law is the subject of much legal research.
Unfortunately, research on judicial review of administrative
rulemaking commonly dwells on the "trees" of procedural doctrine,
while losing sight of the "forest" of social consequences of judicial
review. When researchers do criticize judicial review for creating
adverse consequences, they often seek to correct the problem through
various doctrinal changes designed to enable judges to force "better"
decisionmaking. I have recently questioned the theoretical
justifications for judicial review of administrative rulemaking and
have argued that those justifications do not support a judicial role.'
Even absent a clear theoretical justification for judicial involvement,
judicial review might yet be defended for pragmatic reasons if the
practice tends to produce better regulatory results. In this Article, I
consider the merits of the pragmatic justification for judicial review of
administrative rulemaking. I argue that judicial review ineluctably
produces pathological consequences, so that doctrinal reform is futile.
Because the practice does not-and cannot-improve regulatory
results, I conclude that it is not supported by any pragmatic
justification.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the importance of pragmatic,
consequentialist analysis of judicial review of rulemaking. Such
consequentialism should be relevant to any consideration of law, but
in administrative law the concern is particularly compelling. Laws are
passed to create consequences, and judicial review should be judged
by whether it furthers the intended consequences.
The Part II of the Article explores the effects of judicial review
of rulemaking and considers whether it is consequentially justifiable.
I set forth the pathological consequences of judicial review for the
functioning of the administrative state. The threat of judicial review
ossifies the rulemaking process, making administrators slow and timid
to address their responsibilities. Judicial review also disrupts
administrative agendas, forces misallocation of resources, operates
without regard to political and practical constraints on administrative
action, and reduces the quality of promulgated rules.
1. See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking,
85 VA. L. RV. 1243 passim (1999).
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In the third and final Part, I consider how administrative law has
evolved in such a seemingly pathological pattern. The system of
judicial review represents a strategic decision by members of
Congress, who can take symbolic action on a perceived societal
problem at the demand of voters while at the same time emasculating
the true effect of the action, thereby escaping responsibility for the
costs and other consequences associated with an effective response to
the issue. Litigants and the courts conspire to bolster this structure
because of their own self interests. Yet the structure is contrary to
democratic accountability and the interests of the general public.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSEQUENTIALISM FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Consequentialism may not be quite so significant in relatively
deontological areas of the law, such as First Amendment
jurisprudence. Yet consequences are central to the judicial review of
administrative agency decisions because the typical holding strives to
command a consequence of some sort. While fundamental rights,
such as those of the Bill of Rights, may trump consequentialist
concerns, constitutional review sufficiently protects those very rights.
In administrative law, on the other hand, institutional abilities and
disabilities assume considerable importance. Thus, comparing
institutional strengths and weaknesses is necessary to avoid purely
symbolic action that may prove ineffective or even
counterproductive. Disabling statutes is hardly the path to furthering
the rule of law. The subsequent Part will demonstrate that judicial
review has often produced such perverse results. As Lloyd Cutler has
suggested, the best regulatory reform would be to close the law
schools.2
It is critical, at this point, to distinguish consequentialism from
utilitarianism, the cousin with which it is often confused.' While
utilitarianism probably implies consequentialism, the converse is not
true. One may reject a utilitarian position that seeks to maximize
overall welfare or good, while still emphasizing the importance of
consequences. For example, suppose that an individual ranks the
welfare of the poor over the welfare of the rich-a position that is at
least potentially contrary to utilitarianism-and that the individual
2. See KENNETH J. MEIER ET AL., REGULATION AND CONSUMER PROTECrION:
POLTCS, BUREAUCRACY & ECONOMICS 467 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Judith Lichtenberg, The Right, the All Right, and the Good, 93 YALE L.J
544, 545 (1983) (distinguishing consequentialism from utilitarianism).
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proposes policies to advance that end. Such a person must still attend
to the consequences of those policies in order to see that they indeed
benefit the poor.
Some ethicists have waged a vigorous attack on
consequentialism, arguing that intentionalism, which focuses on the
actor's intent or motives, is more consistent with morality.4 For my
purposes, this point could be conceded. First, the standard for
judging individual action is not necessarily the same as for judging
government action, and I am concerned solely with the latter.5
Second, the objective of administrative law has never required an
investigation of administrators' intentions. Judges are commissioned
to evaluate the substance and consequences, rather than the morality,
of administrators' behavior.6 Hence, it is fair to judge the judges
according to the consequences of their decisions.
My case for consequentialism echoes in great degree the growing
recognition of the values of pragmatism in law, a movement led by
Judge Posner.7 The devotees of this position urge that the law should
aim for the "best results," rather than rest upon some grand theory,
4. See, e.g., Germain Grisez, Against Consequentialism, 23 AM. J. JURIS. 21, 21
(1978). But see Michael J. Perry, Some Notes on Absolutism, Consequentialism, and
Incommensurability, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 967, 967-72 (1985) (arguing that even absolutist
deontological claims are essentially consequentialist insofar as they are defended by virtue
of their consequences).
5. See Lichtenberg, supra note 3, at 548 (arguing that utilitarianism wrongly ignores
the "'independence of the personal point of view'" (quoting S. SCHLEFFER, THE
RE ECON OF CONSEQUENTIALISM: A PILOSOPHCAL INVESTIGATION OF THE
CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING RiVAL MORAL CONCEPTIONS 56 (1982))).
6. Review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706
(1994), is based on the administrative record developed by the agency, and not agency
administrators' subjective motivation for action. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum
Served on the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 156 F.3d 1279, 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (observing that "the ordinary APA cause of action does not ordinarily call into
question the agency's subjective intent"); American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 567 F.2d 1016, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (observing that "courts rarely have [a] basis
for undercutting officials' statements of reasons by inquiring into subjective motivations").
7. The so-called new pragmatism has become quite prominent. See, e.g., RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 227-310 (1999)
(discussing the "pragmatic approach to law" in a range of contexts, including
administrative law); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN.
L. REv. 1331, 1334-76 (1988) (noting that "[a]n impressive array of recent legal
commentary has suggested a movement away from grand theory to something new,
variously called [by different names, including] ... 'pragmatism' "); Thomas C. Grey,
Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 788 (1989) (discussing the "multiple
and apparently clashing strands" of Holmes's reasoning that have developed into the
"central tenets of American pragmatism"); Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to
Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1653 (1990) (stating that "[lately pragmatism has
[been] revived"). Central to this approach is the "insistence that propositions be tested by
their consequences." Posner, supra, at 1660.
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such as formalism or Rawlsian liberalism. My claim, however, is
more modest than that of most of the pragmatists. I do not claim that
consequentialism should exclusively drive the law, but merely that it
should be a substantial factor. Most significantly, I do not claim that
consequentialism should be a universal legal standard-I argue only
for its importance in the field of administrative law. Constitutional
law, for example, might be a field where absolutist or deontological
precepts should rule, at least on occasion.8
Some observers, perhaps even some courts, might dispute
reliance on consequentialism in administrative law as well. Judge
Posner has observed: "One wonders whether the [Supreme] Court
has any clue as to the consequences of its administrative law decisions
for society. Maybe it doesn't think that that is any of its business." 9
Yet consequences should be central to administrative law.
Antipollution legislation, for example, is passed primarily to lessen
pollution, not to provide another forum for public discussion."
Administrative law is not a playground for judges and litigants;
rather, it is a means to a societal end. Regulatory laws "frequently
vest result-oriented discretion in officials," and such discretion can be
evaluated only in light of results." As such, consequentialism should
be paramount in administrative law.'2 Christopher Edley argues that
the only source of legitimacy for judicial review of administrative
actions lies in the courts' ability to enhance "[s]ound governance.'
13
Courts are institutions of government, and, as Mark Tushnet has
argued in a broader context, judicial review "cannot be defended
except by seeing how it operates-whether in fact the government is
better with it than without it."'" Indeed, the case for consideration of
& See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12
(1998) (describing and disagreeing with Ronald Dworkin's position that consideration of
consequences is rarely relevant to constitutional decisionmaking).
9. Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 CMI.-KENT L.
REV. 953, 961 (1997).
10. Some might argue that the "rule of law" justifies nonconsequentialist judicial
review of administrative rulemaking, but this justification cannot stand up under scrutiny.
See Cross, supra note 1, at 1247. Today, few would embrace such legal formalism at the
expense of consequences. See David Luban, What's Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?,
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 44 (1996) ("Fiat lex, pereat mundil-let law exist though the
world perish-is a maxim that could be accepted by only the most dyed-in-the-wool
formalist.").
11. Luban, supra note 10, at 44-45.
12. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 400 (1995) (arguing that in
statutory interpretation judges should "use consequences to guide their decisions").
13. CHRISTOPHERF. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 235 (1990).
14. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 152
(1999).
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consequences may be so plain as to be uncontroversial.15 Cass
Sunstein argues that any legal interpretation "must be defended
partly by reference to its consequences" and asks rhetorically: "If
consequences, broadly conceived, do not matter, what does?' 6
Any residual doubt about the relevance of consequentialism
should be dispelled by the standards of judicial review itself. The
very existence of rulemaking and the procedures adopted to govern
the rulemaking process are attributable to the need "for sound
evolution of policy ... in the public interest."'17 Judge Wald, formerly
of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, has emphasized
the "pragmatic focus" of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
and the importance of judges thinking about how decisions "will play
out in terms of agency functioning."' 8 Courts reviewing agency rules
themselves apply a consequentialist standard to agencies' actions, so
it hardly seems unfair to judge the courts by the same standard.
Judge Coffin of the First Circuit Court of Appeals has written that a
beacon of judging must be workability, meaning the "extent to which
a rule ... can be pronounced with reasonable expectation of effective
observance without impairing the essential functioning of those to
whom the rule applies."' 9 This is what I mean by consequentialism.
However, consequentialism does not mean that courts,
commentators, or others necessarily should seek the most
consequentially desirable policy outcome of every particular case or
controversy. For a variety of reasons set forth in the following Part,
such an approach is undesirable and often produces consequentially
perverse results. Rather, this Article calls for a sort of "rule
consequentialism." I argue that the focus should be on the general
rules that are most likely to produce consequential sanity over the
long run. Courts currently may be employing a form of
consequentialism in trying to produce the best result for every
individual case. Yet case-by-case consequentialism looks at
individual trees rather than the larger forest and may be
counterproductive. A more desirable consequential program might
be to establish a general rule that creates the best consequences,
15. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 10, at 44-45 (suggesting that "very few people think
that lawyers should be indifferent to the outcome of legal decisions" and that such a claim
is in itself "remarkably uncontroversial").
16. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 240 (1999).
17. American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 359 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (en banc).
18. Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership
Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221,258 (1996).
19. FRANKM. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 284 (1994).
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rather than trying to assess the consequences of individual action on a
case-by-case basis. In Part II, I urge that judicial review of
rulemaking is not the type of wise general rule that can produce "best
consequences."
My case for consequentialism at this point is thin. I claim merely
that the proper standard for judicial review of rulemaking will
consider consequences, without taking a definitive position on what
consequences are desirable ones to be promoted in each individual
circumstance. In the following Part, I argue that the consequences of
judicial review are to cripple regulatory legislation and frustrate the
aims of the New Deal and subsequent social legislation of the 1960s
and 1970s. A free market libertarian would applaud these
consequences and therefore, perhaps, affirm current patterns of
judicial review. This position is potentially substantively legitimate,
but must be justified on its merits, not secretly advanced through
dishonest proclamations of the virtues of judicial review. Indeed, the
final Part of my Article suggests that it is in fact this illegitimate
disingenuousness that explains the law of judicial review.
II. PATHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Many analyses of judicial review, both pro and con, focus unduly
on the outcomes of individually litigated cases, and devotees of
judicial review emphasize the occasional decisions that appear to
yield beneficial regulatory results. Such outcomes are but the tip of a
much larger iceberg of influence, however. The shadow of judicial
review has a pervasive effect on agency decisionmaking, and the
commands of preceding cases can have an enormous unforeseen
effect on policymaking, even in areas that are not related directly to
the policies previously litigated. This in turn can have a substantial
adverse effect on public welfare, costing the public the benefits of
regulation, including lives saved. Scrutiny of these indirect effects is
necessary.
This Part explores how judicial review of rulemaking interferes
with the administrative process and indirectly yields significant
adverse consequences. These consequences are sometimes, but not
typically, attributable to "bad" decisions that compel unwise
administrative actions. More often, however, the pathology of
judicial review derives from the indirect, but unavoidable, effect that
review has on the administrative process and on rulemaking. Below I
describe how features of judicial review obstruct agencies' actions.
This Part identifies five discrete pathological effects of judicial
2000] 1019
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review. The first effect is ossification, whereby unpredictable judicial
requirements considerably complicate and delay the promulgation of
individual regulations. The second effect is agenda disruption,
through which judicial demands for agency action undermine other
actions that otherwise could have been taken through a more
coherent and effective planning process. Third, judicial review
compels inefficient and ineffective agency allocation of resources, as
agencies become more concerned with surviving judicial review than
with advancing their commissioned agendas. Fourth, judicial review
commonly fails to understand the political and pragmatic limitations
that agencies face, instead demanding an unachievable "best" that is
the enemy of an achievable "good" outcome. Fifth and finally,
judicial review results in poorer quality rules.
A. General Ossification
Thomas McGarity has described the relative "ossification" of
rulemaking in recent decades as regulatory action has slowed or
halted because of extensive procedural requirements.20  The
ossification is in part reflected in the extensive legal "hoops" through
which an agency must jump in order to promulgate a rule. Agencies
must write detailed Federal Register notices and prepare enormous
technical support documents to justify their rules. Such efforts
require considerable expenditures of resources and time.2 1 These and
other procedural demands bog down the regulatory process. For
example, after the District of Columbia Circuit embraced "hard look"
judicial review, the time required for the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) to adopt a new rule increased from a maximum of two years in
the early 1960s to more than five years in the late 1970s. 2
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rules
20. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-87 (1992) [hereinafter McGarity, Some Thoughts on
"Deossifying"] (observing that "[i]mportant rulemaking initiatives grind along at such a
deliberate pace that they are often consigned to regulatory purgatory, never to be
resurrected again"); see also Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEx. L. REV. 525, 528 (1997)
[hereinafter McGarity, Ossification of Rulemaking] (observing that "it has become so
difficult for agencies to promulgate major rules that some regulatory programs have
ground to a halt").
21. See MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECION AGENCY:
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 124 (1990) (reviewing the history of Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act regulations and observing that "very substantial
resources were consumed meeting the requirements of administrative procedure and
anticipating litigation").
22- See McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying," supra note 20, at 1389-90.
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similarly have been delayed.' As individual rules take longer to
promulgate, fewer rules are adopted 4  The Administrative
Conference of the United States has lamented that "the rulemaking
process has become increasingly less effective and more time-
consuming."'  As a result of judicial demands, "an agency usually
must commit tens of thousands of person-hours over a five-year
period to the process of issuing, amending, or rescinding a single
major rule.
26
The foremost reason for this ossification of rulemaking has been
"[j]udicially imposed analytical requirements." 27 The most common
basis for judicial review of rulemaking is that of "reasoned
decisionmaking," under which the court concludes that the agency
failed to analyze the record correctly or consider some alternative
that a litigant has dreamed up?8 Walter Gellhorn recognized this
pattern even before passage of the APA, warning that "sporadic,
inexpert and superficial dictation by the courts will never produce
methods of administration which are both workable and fair," but
rather will "serve[] chiefly to obstruct the development of sound
administrative processes. '29 In fact, research on the Food and Drug
23. See id. at 1387 (observing that the time required for Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) rulemaking increased from six months in 1972 to five
years in the 1980s).
24. See id. (observing that of 19 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rules proposed in
the latter half of the 1970s, only seven were completed). In Some Thoughts on Deossifying
the Rulemaking Process, McGarity lists several major areas of rulemaking that have been
obstructed by ossification. See id. at 1413-18. In a subsequent article, McGarity observed
that OSHA standard setting has been ossified by the "prospect of judicial review by a
judge who demands that every fine nuance of the agency's decision be explained to that
judge's satisfaction." Thomas 0. McGarity, Reforming OSHA: Some Thoughts for the
Current Legislative Agenda, 31 Hous. L. REV. 99, 109 (1994).
25. Steven J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda- Conclusions from an
Empirical Study of EPA's Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress Projections, 53 MD. L. REV.
521, 529 (1994) (quoting ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. COMM. ON
RULEMAKING, IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR AGENCY RULEMAKING 1 (1993)).
26. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of
Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61,71 (1997).
27. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying," supra note 20, at 1389; see also
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 443 (1998) (noting that "the availability of judicial review of agency
rulemaking undercuts [agencies'] ability to respond rapidly to new developments in
specialized areas"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure
Act, 32 TULSA L. 185, 199 (1996) (reporting that judicial review of rules "is the primary
source of the phenomenon of rulemaking ossification").
28. See Cross, supra note 1, at 1265 (describing the prevalence of reasoned
decisionmaking review).
29. Walter Gellhorn, The Improvement of Public Administration, 2 NAT'L LAW.
GUILD Q. 20,22 (1939-1940).
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Administration (FDA) found that the "agency resource costs
associated with judicialized procedures were so great that they often
served as a disincentive to issue rules or as a lever which industry
used to Secure concessions on proposed regulations."3 Courts have
demanded increasingly "synoptic" decisionmaking processes, which
have compelled the production of "enormous" rulemaking records.
31
Aggressive judicial review "can impose a burden of proof on an
agency that is extremely difficult-read extremely expensive-or
impossible to meet."32
Judicial review inevitably increases the transaction costs of
regulation, which, axiomatically, means less regulation.3 In addition
to mandating more procedures and analysis, the uncertainty of
judicial review compels agencies to bend over backward and to
implement more procedure than the average court is likely to
demandY Justice Breyer explains that a judicial decision requiring
consideration of alternative policies can "lead the agency to establish
procedures to consider thoroughly all alternatives in every case,"
which will only cause "considerable unproductive delay."35 This delay
means less regulation as resources become strained and as certain
rules-that otherwise could be justified in themselves-become cost
ineffective in light of the additional procedural demands.
Such judicially imposed analytical requirements are themselves
bad enough, but they also are applied unevenly, which requires
agencies to "prepare for the worst-case scenario on judicial review. 3 6
Hence, the regulatory process is not driven by the median judicial
panel, but by a concern for appeasing the most intrusive judicial
panel.37 Indeed, the most intrusive circuit is likely to hear a case
30. WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: POLITICS AND PROCESSES
188 (1985).
31. See Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447,466 (1986).
32. John S. Applegate, Worst Things FirsL Risk; Information, and Regulatory
Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277,297 (1992).
33. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 283 (1989) (observing that the "more one
has to explain and justify, the less one is likely to do").
34. Indeed, the "real impediment [to rulemaking] caused by judicial review is
uncertainty" itself. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE 165 (1997).
35. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 58 (1993). The perception
of agencies regarding judicial review is that "anything can happen." MASHAWv, supra note
34, at 165.
36. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying," supra note 20, at 1419; Shapiro,
supra note 31, at 466 (observing that "agencies cannot know in advance when reviewing
courts will make such demands," so they have an incentive to produce the most extensive
record possible).
37. See DONALD L. HOROWIZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 44 (1977)
(noting that judicial decisions may produce law for the "worst case or for the best," but
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because plaintiffs who challenge the rule can be expected to select the
most favorable forum for review.38  In the early days of OSHA
standard-setting, for example, "[d]ifferent industry organizations
challenged every one of the new standards, trying their luck in
different courts of appeal around the country while avoiding the pro-
regulatory D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals."3 9 The challenges struck
gold with a Fifth Circuit success that was regarded as "a serious blow
to OSHA's entire standard setting program. '
Besides leading to legally incorrect4' results, the unintended
encouragement of extreme and unrepresentative judicial outcomes
undermines regulatory action prior to judicial review. When a
regulator must anticipate and adapt to every conceivable challenge
and the reaction of the most hostile judge, she is destined to spend
most of her time "playing defense" with little time left for taking
regulatory affirmative action.' Moreover, the "risk of reversal of
rulemakings due to reasons an agency cannot predict or control will
deter rulemaking generally."'43 The cost of "excessively stringent
not necessarily for the "mean or modal case").
38. See R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS 362 (1983). Experienced
litigants "in public policy cases are usually keenly aware of the political leanings of the
judges before whom they appear." CRISTOPHER E. SMrrH, COURTS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 14 (1993).
39. JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONs 222 (1989).
40. Id. at 223.
41. Of course, there is no external standard enabling us to test the "rightness" of a
judicial decision. Because judges probably are among the best determiners of "rightness,"
to the extent any legal interpretation can be said to be objectively correct, the standard
presumably would be the average judicial interpretation. When judges disagree, it seems
fair to suggest that "rightness" more likely lies with the majority of judges rather than with
extreme outliers. By definition then, the extreme interpretation is wrong.
42. As Jerry Mashaw has explained:
Because the courts are relatively uninformed about what is important among the
many issues thrown up by parties seeking review of a rule, and because they are
technically and scientifically unsophisticated in analyzing the issues that they
perceive to be critical to a rule's "reasonableness," the perception in the agencies
is that anything can happen. This produces defensive rulemaking, if not
abandonment of the rulemaking process.
MASHAW, supra note 34, at 165; see also McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying,"
supra note 20, at 1412 (reporting that agencies "must attempt to prepare responses to all
contentions that may prove credible to an appellate court, no matter how ridiculous they
may appear to agency staff"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 74 (1995) (reporting that agencies cannot predict the
issues upon which courts will focus).
43. Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 485
n.13 (1997) (citing authorities to this effect). Steven J. Groseclose has described the effect
of judicial review on Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rulemaking:
The expectation of stringent scrutiny after promulgation of a rule causes agencies
2000] 1023
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[requirements] is a sluggish or paralyzed standard-setting process."'
This "sluggishness" has been well documented. An American
Bar Association commission concluded that cumbersome
administrative procedures led to excessive delay in regulation.45 An
investigation by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
found that undue delay was the largest impediment to effective
functioning of federal regulation and blamed this delay on
"overjudicialization" of the regulatory process. 6  A Carnegie
Commission report also has detailed the extent of ossification.47 The
Commission observed that because of judicial scrutiny of rulemaking,
agencies now require an average of five years to take action on a
major rule, and many rules for which there is apparent need are never
adopted. 48
Thus, in addition to slowing the process of rulemaking, judicial
review can have the effect of discouraging rulemaking altogether.
Most agencies may act either by creating a rule to govern future
actions (like a statute) or by creating standards by adjudicating
enforcement actions (like common law). Agencies began to use
rulemaking rather than adjudication in the 1960s and 1970s for good
reason. Many benefits of rulemaking procedures have been
enumerated, including: the provision of decisional standards,
reduction of uncertainty, enhanced efficiency in enforcement, greater
fairness, improved policy decisions, and greater accountability.49
to take a defensive posture from the beginning of the rulemaking process. Extra
personnel hours and resources are expended developing ultra-defensible records,
and decisionmakers scrutinize each progressive step of the tortuous process.
Rulemaking decisions are not based simply on EPA's fundamental technical
expertise, but also on EPA's perception of the courts' likely reactions. A history
of erratic judicial review of technical issues has created significant uncertainty
within EPA.
Groseclose, supra note 25, at 536.
44. John P. Dwyer, Overregulation, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 719,737 (1988).
45. See ABA COMM'N ON LAW & ECONS., FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO
REFORM 92 (1979).
46. See S. REP. NO. 95-72, at ix (1977) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 4.G74/9:R26/v.3-6) (finding
that delay posed the greatest problem to effective regulatory function); id. at 52 (finding
that overiJudicialization was to blame for regulatory delay).
47. See generally CARNEGIE COMM'N, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING
REGULATORY DECISIONMAKING (1993) (reviewing and analyzing agency
decisionmaking processes).
48. See S. REP. NO. 95-72, at 108.
49. See Pierce, supra note 27, at 189 (listing these and other benefits). As an example,
Professor Pierce observes that a shift to rulemaking from adjudication enabled the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to create "a gas market in which robust
competition yields aggressive innovation, unparalleled efficiency, abundant supplies, and
low prices." ld. at 190; see also Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A
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Ossification, however, increasingly has prompted agencies to shift
from rulemaking back to adjudicatory methods of policymaking.
Such a shift is economically inevitable-if courts make rulemaking
more difficult and more costly, agencies will do less of it0 If an
agency wants to continue acting, its alternative is adjudication. Yet
such a shift produces inferior policy and incidentally undermines the
very virtues that judicial review is intended to promote. When all the
consequences of judicial review make even formal adjudicatory action
too onerous for an agency, the agency may regulate functionally
through mere "threats of prosecution" or "raised eyebrows," but
these methods will cause losses of "openness, consistency, and,
perhaps, rationality-precisely the values that administrative law has
sought to protect."'"
This effect of judicial review has been documented in an
extensive study of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA).52 NHTSA began with active auto safety
regulation and was in the vanguard of regulatory action. Because of
difficulties with judicial review, however, NHTSA had problems
promulgating rules requiring safety improvements in cars and
therefore shifted to a program of recalls for automobile defects.53
Judicial second-guessing played a major role in causing NHTSA to
abandon systematic rulemaking.54 Recalls were much easier to
sustain in court and had fewer procedural requirements.5 5 Recalls
offered far fewer safety benefits, however, and "NHTSA's shift from
standard setting to recalls signaled the abandonment of its safety
Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 255 (1986) (arguing that rulemaking
produces more rational policies and is more efficient for both agencies and interested
parties).
50. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty
Years of Law and Politics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 249, 301
(explaining how making rulemaking more expensive will force "agency resources away
from the rulemaking area into other, less productive forms of regulation").
51. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the
Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 421 (1996).
52. See generally JERRY L. MAsHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR
AUTO SAFETY (1990) (tracing the history of various National Highway Transportation
Safety Administration (NHTSA) regulatory efforts).
53. See id. at 225 (observing that "[t]he result of judicial requirements for
comprehensive rationality has been a general suppression of the use of rules"); id. at 249
(reporting that "the courts have been even more obstructionist than one might have
expected").
54. See id. at 225.
55. See id. at 152 (observing that judicial practice was "giving the agency a hard time
when reviewing its rules and an easy time when enforcing its recall orders").
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mission."56  Thus, judicial review undermined effective regulation
and, incidentally, undermined the legislation that created the agency's
original safety mission. 7 In addition, judicial review made the agency
wary of taking any actions to compel safety that were not fully road-
tested, thereby thwarting the agency's statutory mission of technology
forcing for safety.5
8
There is broad, if not universal, recognition that rulemaking is a
sagacious approach to policymaking. 9 It opens decisions to the entire
public, not just to the parties whose interests are directly at stake in
an adjudication.' Rulemaking is also more visible to the public and
to the government institutions responsible for overseeing agency
actions. 1 Rulemaking is more effective and efficient because it
56. Id. at 167.
57. The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) had a very similar experience.
See Terrence M. Scanlon & Robert A. Rogowsky, Back-Door Rulemaking: A View from
the CPSC, REGULATION, July/Aug. 1984, at 27, 28 (describing how encumbrance of the
rulemaking process has forced a shift to adjudication and limited the effectiveness of the
CPSC). FERC also experienced comparable problems. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Unruly
Judicial Review of Rulemaking, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1990, at 23, 23
(discussing the effect of judicial reversals of FERC rules); Peter H. Schuck, When the
Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy
Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 167 (same).
58. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 52, at 69-105,121-23.
59. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINsTRATIvE LAW § 6.15 (1970) (describing
rulemaking as "one of the greatest inventions of modern government"); WEST, supra note
30, at 58 (observing that "there has long been a near consensus among students of the
administrative process that the use of rulemaking to guide individual decisions is desirable
in most contexts"); Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal
Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349, 359
(1999) (noting that "[r]ulemaking, by its very design, is considered to be an efficient
policy-making mechanism").
Some agencies eschew rulemaking in favor of adjudication (perhaps for reasons
unrelated to concerns about judicial review), but this choice can result in criticism. The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is one such agency. Scholars have criticized the
NLRB for its reliance on adjudication, noting the resulting lack of efficiency as well as
other problems. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A
Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 163, 176-77 (1985) (arguing that rulemaking
would provide better reasoned and more consistent policy); Charles J. Morris, The NLRB
in the Dog House-Can an Old Board Learn New Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9, 27
(1987) (arguing that rulemaking would be more economically efficient for the NLRB); see
also Robert Willmore, NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness,
89 YALE L.J. 982, 983 (1980) (suggesting that the NLRB avoids rulemaking precisely to
avoid clear statements of policy and to thereby avoid intrusive judicial and congressional
review).
60. See Ralph F. Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw.
U. L. REv. 781,789 (1965) (explaining how rulemaking enables an agency to focus on key
policy issues without being diverted by the narrower and more specific concerns of the
parties to an adjudication).
61. See, e.g., Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72
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enables an agency to consider a broader range of information on the
consequences of its decision and "because of the economy obtained
by dealing directly with an entire category of situations in a single
proceeding rather than making law on a case-by-case basis in
numerous proceedings."6 2 Beyond simply producing inferior policies,
decisionmaking by adjudication contravenes the checking and
dialogic purposes that judicial review means to advance.63
Ossification distorts the outcomes of rules and means less
rulemaking overall. Decades ago, the Supreme Court warned that
judicial review could transform executive agencies into "mere fact
finding bodies deprived of the advantages of prompt and definite
action." 64 This fear has largely come to pass. Judicial analytical
demands have, for example, "substantially emasculated
environmental control programs."'  Agencies still regulate, but the
process has become agonizing. Judicial review is not the sole cause of
delay and rulemaking ossification, but it is a major cause.6 And
judicial review unavoidably causes ossification in proportion to its
intrusiveness. It is the risk of unpredictable second-guessing by
courts that forces agencies to expend many more resources in
rulemaking.
B. Agenda Disruption
Ossification means that any one regulation is more difficult to
adopt. Judicial review, however, also disrupts the ability of agencies
to regulate via a coordinated and coherent regulatory agenda. When
judges remand a regulatory decision, resources must be directed back
to the now-vacated action. When judges compel regulatory action,
VA. L. REv. 297, 328 (1986) (pointing out that "agency case law is less visible than agency
rules" and that neither the executive nor legislative branches "can monitor agency law
created wholly on a case-by-case basis as effectively as they can monitor agency law made
in the form of rules").
62. 1&
63. See Cross, supra note 1, at 1247 (summarizing these justifications for judicial
review).
64. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402,412 (1941).
65. Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE
J. ON REG. 89, 133 (1988). Latin provides the example of how comprehensive OSHA
carcinogen regulation was destroyed by the courts. See id. at 132-33; Howard Latin, Ideal
Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-
Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1329 (1985) (stating that "making
particularized risk estimates legally relevant emasculate[s] the regulation of carcinogens
under prevailing conditions of scientific uncertainty").
66. See McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying," supra note 20, at 1396-98 (listing
sources of ossification, beginning with notice and comment rulemaking procedures but
including congressional and presidential oversight).
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even more resources must be dedicated to the priorities set by the
courts and often must be shifted to those priorities on short notice.
APA procedural requirements may themselves disrupt agenda
setting.67 A new statutory interpretation issuing from judicial review
likewise may disrupt a careful plan of agency action.
This Section focuses on judicial "agency forcing," which occurs
when a court orders an agency to embark on a particular regulatory
program or set rules for a particular hazard. Agency forcing is the
most problematic agenda disruption that an agency might face,
because the agency is compelled directly to concentrate on a
particular problem that it may consider a lower priority than other
concerns on its agenda. Thus, agency-forcing litigation is especially
ironic and perverse, because a judicial intention to compel regulation
and protect public health has the indirect effect of undermining those
same goals.
When courts step in to command agency action, they thereby
command a shift of agency resources to that action.' Agencies do not
receive additional resources to respond to the judicial decree.69 As a
result, "[o]ftentimes new programs are [not] implemented because
resources are devoted to meeting court demands. '7 For example, for
many Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) divisions,
"compliance with court orders ... [has] become the top priority,"
creating "judicial dominance over the formulation of EPA policy."'
An empirical study of EPA's regulatory agenda under the Clean Air
Act found that the Agency was more responsive to judicial deadlines
than to statutory deadlines.72 Setting deadlines for agency decisions
simply "empowers private parties to use the courts to force an agency
67. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok- The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REv. 173, 215 (1997) (reporting that
"participation of a broad range of interests before an agency may affect the ability of
agency decisionmakers to control their own agendas and set priorities").
68. Agency-forcing litigation, commonly initiated by an environmental or other public
interest groups, is aimed at compelling an agency to take regulatory action against some
particular hazard of concern to the group. See John D. Graham, The Failure of Agency-
Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act,
1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 124.
69. See ROSEMARY O'LEARY, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE EPA 160 (1993) ("With one exception, the EPA has not received additional staff or
funds from Congress to enable it to comply with specific court decisions.").
70. Id. at 164.
71. Id, at 169; see also Cornelius M. Kerwin, The Elements of Rule-Making, in
HANDBOOK OF REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 356, 375 (David H.
Rosenbloom & Richard D. Schwartz eds., 1994) (reporting that judicial orders
"immediately become the top priority of the affected agency").
72. See Groseclose, supra note 25, at 536, app. at 562.
1028 [Vol. 78
JUDICIAL REVIEW OFRULEMAKING
to reallocate its resources from tasks the agency considers more
important to tasks it considers less important."'73 Some of these
private parties may seem ideologically appealing, but there is no
principled basis to let, for instance, the Sierra Club run EPA.
Moreover, there are good reasons why such private organizations will
not authentically represent the general public interest.74
Agenda disruption is sometimes called the "polycentric
problem."75 This problem arises because the types of issues for which
agencies are responsible "cannot be resolved independently and
sequentially; they are, rather, interdependent, and a choice from one
set of alternatives has implications for preferences within other sets of
alternatives," so that "[t]he decision-maker must take into account
the whole network before she can reach a single decision."76 Courts
deciding cases almost inevitably must consider the issues of a
particular case independently, out of context. Courts are unable to
understand the complex interdependencies, much less address them.
77
The judicial process purposely isolates judges from the real-world
effects of their decisionsY8 As a result, Martin Shapiro observes that
"the judge enters highly complex ongoing situations just far enough
and just long enough to pull out a crucial brick and then scampers
away, leaving it to the rest of the political system to somehow make
73. Pierce, supra note 26, at 82.
74. See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and
Empowerment, 16 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 435, 465-66 (1991) (noting that such organizations
have internal objectives other than their missions and may themselves be captured by
outside interests).
75. For the classic discussion of this problem, see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 passim (1978).
76. ANTHONY I. OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 117
(1994).
77. See id. (observing that the "adversarial setting of the judicial process does not lend
itself to grappling with this problem"); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest,
and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REv. 271, 292 (1986) (observing that
courts are incapable of dealing with polycentric characteristics or decisions, a problem
"aggravated by the inability of courts to impose a coordinated or hierarchical structure, by
their lack of familiarity with the often technically complex issues at hand, and by their lack
of political accountability").
78. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN.
L. REV. 363, 389 (1986) (observing that "courts work within institutional rules that
deliberately disable them from seeking out information relevant to the inquiry at hand");
Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review of Complex Administrative Agency Decisions, 462
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 82 (1982) (noting that "it is not unusual for us
to learn from a newspaper or magazine article for the first time about the potential
political, economic, or social effects of our decisions-effects which counsel, for their own
reasons, may be reluctant to discuss").
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sure that the wall does not fall down. '79
In a different context, Frank Michelman urged that judicial
action is incapable institutionally of accomplishing global fairness
because "restriction to the occasional foothold which litigation
furnishes may disable courts from making competent judgments
about fairness, or from prescribing adequate cures for its absence,
since fairness is a quality of courses or networks of decisions rather
than of any particular decision which may generate a case or
controversy."'8 Administrative law decisions "are ad hoc; they are
rarely informed by a comprehensive view of the agency's work, and
they cannot aspire to anything approaching the status of a coherent
policy."'
On occasion, judges have recognized the problems of agenda
disruption that can result from agency forcingY2 The relative judicial
deference to agency inaction is based on this recognition. More
deferential review is provided when "'the agency has chosen not to
regulate for reasons ill-suited to judicial resolution, e.g., because of
internal management consideration as to budget and personnel or for
reasons made after a weighing of competing policies.' "8 Yet this
occasional recognition does not prevent frequent agenda-disrupting
litigation.
In one case, the D.C. Circuit conceded that it would hesitate to
order expedited OSHA regulation of ethylene oxide "if such a
command would seriously disrupt other rulemakings of higher or
competing priority."'  OSHA contended that the court decision
would be disruptive, but the court concluded that ethylene oxide was
more important than the three other pending actions that would be
79. Martin Shapiro, Judicial Activism, in THE THIRD CENTURY: AMERICA AS A
POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 129 (Seymour M. Lipset ed., 1979).
80. Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1247 (1967)
(questioning courts' ability to define fairness in takings law).
81. Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts as Monitors of the Bureaucracy, in MAKING
BUREAUCRACIES WoRK 89,97 (Carol H. Weiss & Allen Barton eds., 1980).
82. Examples of this recognition are rare. I have found only two cases that expressly
considered the risk. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
The Auchter decision contended that its ruling would cause no such disruption. Auchter,
702 F.2d at 1158. However, Thomas rejected injunctive relief against the agency because
of the risk of disruption. Thomas, 828 F.2d at 797-99.
83. Professional Pilots Fed'n v. Federal Aviation Admin., 118 F.3d 758,763 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (quoting Bargmann v. Helms, 715 F.2d 638,640 (D.C Cir. 1983)).
84. Auchter, 702 F.2d at 1158.
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delayed by an agency-forcing decision.' The opinion is striking for its
arrogance. The court was confident somehow that it better
understood occupational risk than did OSHA. Subsequent research
has proven the court wrong. The ethylene oxide standard prevented
an estimated four to six cases of cancer annually.86 However, it was
estimated that the delayed standards, including hazard
communication, asbestos, and ethylene dibromide, would have saved
more than 250 lives annually.' The example of ethylene oxide
suggests that even when judges try to be more polycentric, they are
not good at it.
Other examples of agenda disruption through agency forcing are
common. Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act,' litigation resulted in "major parts of [EPA's] pesticide program
[being] shut down completely over a six-year period. '89 A similar
consequence arose under the Clean Water Act9° when successful
environmental litigation, culminating in the Flannery consent decree,
which compelled regulation of toxins in water, drew resources from
more beneficial EPA programs.91 The Clean Air Act's 9 hazardous
air pollutant regulatory program has encountered similar difficulties.
John Graham reports that court requirements regarding EPA
standards for benzene, radionuclides, and arsenic caused "additional
85. See id. The three ongoing OSHA programs that were allegedly threatened by the
agency-forcing order were a hazard communication standard to inform workers of the
threats presented by hazardous substances on the job, an analysis of current regulations
regarding worker asbestos exposure, and exposure standards for asbestos and ethylene
dibromide. See id.
86. See RABKIN, supra note 39, at 234.
87. See Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed. Reg. 45,956, 45,977
(1983) (proposed Oct. 7, 1983) (indicating in a notice of proposed rulemaking that the
proposed new OSHA ethylene dibromide standard would save one to five lives per year);
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, Tremolite, Anthophyllite, and Aztinolite, 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1910, 1926 (1987) (establishing the final occupational exposure to asbestos rule with
estimated benefits of saving 75 to 88 lives per year); John F. Morall III, A Review of the
Record, REGULATION, Nov./Dec. 1986, at 25, 30 (1986) (estimating that the hazard
communication standard would save about 200 lives per year).
88. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994).
89. O'LEARY, supra note 69, at 65 (discussing how a series of court decisions required
EPA to halt various regulatory programs and shift personnel even when the agency
prevailed ultimately).
90. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
91. See Alden F. Abbott, The Case Against Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines:
A Cost-Benefit Appraisal, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 194 (1987). See generally MARC
ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLIcs IN TRANSITION 145 (1993) (observing that the
"courts have forced the agency to redirect scarce resources to fund court-mandated
programs that are often of less importance than other enforcement activities").
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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delays in the development of health assessment documents for
unlisted pollutants, new delays in the Agency's review of emission
standards now in effect for listed pollutants, and substantial setbacks
in the development of several new source performance standards for
pollutants under section 111 of the Clean Air Act."9 Despite this loss
of agency action, the attempt to force EPA decisionmaking "had little
beneficial result" because of remediability problems associated with
the court orders.94
Giving the courts control over any agency's agenda is irrational.
In addition to courts' lack of accountability or expertise, individual
judicial decisions are "narrowly focused on the issues presented in a
case" and ignore the larger context of agency concerns. 95 Yet this
larger picture is the most essential information in agenda setting.
Because courts fail to consider individual issues in their full context,
judicial agency forcing "divert[s] limited resources from an area of
pressing need to one the agency has found not even worthy of
consideration.
96
Judicial control over agency agendas has a direct adverse effect
on public health because "[h]uge amounts of resources have been
dedicated to meeting court decisions, when the environmental and
health benefits, at times, have been marginal."" Former EPA
Administrator William Ruckelshaus complained that
environmentalist-sponsored litigation has "forced [EPA] regulators to
spend unjustified amounts of money to prevent insignificant health
risks."98 Judicial decrees aimed at specific hazardous air pollutants
and toxic water pollutants have drawn EPA resources away from
other efforts that would have provided greater environmental
benefit.99 This trend demonstrates that courts lack the information
and expertise necessary to make wise allocations of resources among
agency options.'00 As a result, other, more pressing problems go
93. Graham, supra note 68, at 124.
94. Id at 127.
95. O'LEARY, supra note 69, at 169.
96. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 564
(1985).
97. O'LEARY, supra note 69, at 169.
98. Robert E. Taylor, Group's Influence on U.S. Environmental Laws, Policies Earns
It a Reputation as a Shadow EPA, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1986, § 2, at 50 (quoting
Administrator Ruckelshaus).
99. See FRANK B. CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY-INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW
153 (1989).
100. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 311, 358 (explaining
that "courts are not in a position to make a considered judgment concerning how the
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unattended.
The problems that agencies are forced to leave unattended and
unregulated may be of considerable importance. EPA, for example,
has been criticized extensively for focusing its efforts on small risks to
health while ignoring greater risks.'0 ' This misdirected focus is
attributable in part to judicial review." The consequences of such
distorted priority setting are tragic. The Harvard School of Public
Health has calculated that improved priority setting across federal
agencies could provide either savings of $31.1 billion from current
cost levels with no additional loss of life or savings of 60,200 lives at
current cost levels.103
While courts ordinarily do not take express note of the
quantitative costs of agenda disruption, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged in general terms the limitations of judicial review in
agenda setting. In an opinion holding that an agency decision to use a
particular program to achieve a statutory goal was committed to the
agency's discretion, the Court explained that such decisions require:
"a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are
peculiarly within [the agency's] expertise": whether its
''resources are best spent" on one program or another;
whether it "is likely to succeed" in fulfilling its statutory
mandate; whether a particular program "best fits the
agency's overall policies"; and, "indeed, whether the agency
has enough resources" to fund a program "at all" .... [T]he
agency is "far better equipped than the courts to deal with
the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its
priorities. ' '1°4
agency might best allocate its limited resources among competing priorities, court orders
force agency choices that may misallocate those resources").
101. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L., 887, 929-
30 (1994).
102. Judicial review shares blame with congressional oversight for the fact that "EPA's
... priorities are diverging from the agency's own perception of the relative risks
presented by various environmental hazards." Lazarus, supra note 100, at 358; see also
Applegate, supra note 32, at 296-98 (observing that priority setting to address the greatest
risks requires agency flexibility and freedom from external controls); Lazarus, supra note
100, at 355 (reporting that "misdirected priorities" are a result of a "combination of
impossible statutory mandates and increased judicial access").
103. See Tammy 0. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard
Social Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 167, 177 (Robert
W. Hahn ed., 1996).
104. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) (reversing a lower court opinion
directing spending decisions of the Indian Health Service and quoting Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 831 (1987)); see also Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 797 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (observing that courts are "ill-suited to review the order in which an agency
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The Court's acknowledgment of the importance of respecting each
agency's ability and need to set its own agenda is appropriate, but it
commonly is ignored in circuit court opinions. Judicial commands for
additional analysis or compelled regulation severely violate agency
priority setting, but the lower courts blithely continue issuing such
commands.
In addition to the problems of direct agency forcing, judicial
review introduces systematic biases that impede sound regulation,
thereby creating other disruptions in what could otherwise be sane
agency agendas. For example, litigation creates a "managerial bias
... toward regulating newly discovered hazards at the expense of long
recognized but still inadequately regulated hazards."'10 5 Such new
threats have a higher public profile and are thus more likely to
provoke agency-forcing litigation.0 6 Such litigation promotes the
regulation of new problems at the expense of old problems.
The new problem bias has perverse effects on the public interest.
Additional regulation of new hazards not only diverts regulatory
attention away from old sources, but the greater control requirements
imposed by the courts also add to the costs of establishing regulations
to guard against these threats. The two results therefore combine to
perpetuate the underregulated old hazards.'0 This result is perverse
because new hazards are consistently safer than old ones. 08 Sunstein
warns that to "regulate new risks in the interest of health and safety is
to perpetuate old ones, and thus to reduce health and safety."'1 9 One
study found that new source standards for electric power generation
caused a twenty percent increase in air pollution in the northeastern
states in 1980 due to the perpetuation of old generating plants.1'0 The
excessive regulation of new hazards may be substantially attributable
conducts its business" and that courts are often "hesitant to upset an agency's priorities by
ordering it to expedite one specific action, and thus to give it precedence over others").
105. RABKIN, supra note 39, at 232.
106. See iL; see also MELNICK, supra note 38, at 366 (noting that the results of judicial
review are to place a "heavy regulatory burden on new facilities").
107. See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 851, 877-81 (1996).
108. See id. at 876 (claiming that "new products and facilities are almost universally
safer than existing ones"); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of
Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277,298 (1985) (observing that
there is "hardly a product in use today-a car, plane, boiler, municipal water system, drug,
vaccine, or hypodermic syringe-that is not many times safer than its counterpart of a
generation or even a decade ago").
109. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 106 (1990).
110. See BRUCE YANDLE, THE POLITICAL LIMITs OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION 88-89 (1989).
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to Congress, but clearly is exacerbated by judicial review of rules.
Another inherent shortcoming of agenda setting through agency-
forcing judicial review is grounded in its unavoidable structure of
policymaking through legalism. Public interest advocates are drawn
to the best legal case rather than the most important policy concern.
For example,
it seems unlikely that consumer safety advocates like Ralph
Nader's Public Citizen would have focused attention on
color additives or food additives posing absurdly tiny risks-
when so many more substantial health risks, even so many
more substantial carcinogens remain unregulated or
underregulated-except for the fact that the Delaney Clause
happened to provide an easy legal claim against the
former."'
Yet the attempts to rigidly apply the Delaney Clause" 2 actually
increased the mortality and morbidity risks of pesticides. The
National Academy of Sciences has demonstrated that vagaries in the
law meant that the Delaney Clause actually would increase pesticide
risks.' In addition, the strict application failed to account for the
considerable potential health benefits of pesticides." 4  When the
executive branch sought to apply a more rational and health-
protective approach to pesticide regulation, however, it was struck
down in court as contrary to the Delaney Clause." 5 The result was
greater risk to public health and a diversion of agency resources from
more pressing health problems." 6 As this example indicates, judicial
control over agenda setting interferes with sound regulation. As a
111. RABKIN, supra note 39, at 268.
112. The Delaney Clause prohibits food additives shown to cause cancer in animal tests
from being used in processed foods, regardless of the relative risk of cancer or the actual
risk to humans. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994). For a discussion of the background
of the Delaney Clause and the problems EPA faced when attempting to implement the
law through regulations, see Frank B. Cross, The Consequences of Consensus: Dangerous
Compromises of the Food Quality Protection Act, 75 WASH U. L.Q. 1155 passim (1997).
113. See COMMrITEE ON SCIENTIFIC AND REGULATORY ISSUES UNDERLYING
PESTICIDE USE PATTERNS AND AGRIC. INNOVATION, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD: THE DELANEY PARADOX 40(1987).
114. See generally Cross, supra note 112, passim (discussing at length how restrictions
on pesticide use can undermine public health).
115. EPA sought to apply a de minimis standard for pesticide residues and avoid the
paradoxical increase of risk created by the Delaney Clause. See Notice: Regulation of
Pesticides in Food: Addressing the Delaney Paradox Policy Statement, 53 Fed. Reg.
41,104 (1988). A federal appellate court vacated this effort. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d
985, 986 (9th Cir. 1992).
116. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 107, at 911 (concluding that the focus on pesticide
contamination of foods has diverted the FDA from greater hazards of microbial
contamination of food).
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result, it also undermines accountability to the public." 7
C. Resource Misallocation
Resource misallocation attributable to judicial review is not
limited to the direct agenda disruption that results from agency-
forcing litigation. The shadow of judicial review necessarily compels
agencies to devote considerable resources to surviving that review
process. Consequently, agencies must devote more resources and
authority to lawyers and legal research-and, concomitantly, fewer
resources to substantive research and analysis. For example, the
threat of judicial review under the Clean Air Act "greatly enhanced
the bureaucratic position of politically naive and technically ignorant
attorneys within ... EPA.""' When an activist group succeeds in
agency-forcing litigation, the simple result is that "limited agency
resources may be expended in litigation over deadlines rather than in
writing regulations.""' 9 For instance, in the case of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the "very need to defend Board
certification decisions in court is itself a substantial burden on the
Board's resources that could otherwise be used to administratively
process Board certification disputes more quickly.'
20
Even absent judicial review, agencies would surely devote some
resources to legal analysis, in order to ensure that their actions are
consistent with the law.'2 ' Jonathan Macey has observed that lawyers
in agencies offer both costs and benefits.'2 He stresses that at some
point the net value of lawyers becomes negative," and his discussion
suggests that the point has been passed. He observes, inter alia, that
lawyers in agencies tend to be conservative, reactive, and risk
adverse; 24 that they "add delay to the administrative decisionmaking
process";'" that they may produce structural regulations grounded in
117. See Rossi, supra note 67, at 221 (arguing that "[a]gency-supervised agenda setting
is important" for accountability and neutral analysis). On the relative accountability of
the bureaucracy versus the courts, see Cross, supra note 1, at 1274.
118. MELNICK, supra note 38, at 302-03.
119. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying," supra note 20, at 1456.
120. Michael C. Harper, The Case for Limiting Judicial Review of Labor Board
Certification Decisions, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262,287 (1987).
121. See Cross, supra note 1, at 1329-30 (discussing evidence that agencies care about
lawfulness regardless of judicial review); id. at 1290-1301 (discussing other incentives for
agency lawfulness).
122. See Jonathan R. Macey, Lawyers in Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and
Process, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998, at 109, 109.
123. See iL at 109-10.
124. See id. at 110-11.
125. Id. at 115.
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"righteous indignation and moral superiority"; 126 that they are
"indifferent to objective truth and scientific rigor"; 2 7 and that their
inclinations are "fundamentally at odds with the model of
administrative agency as dispassionate, technical, scientific, and truth-
seeking."' 8 On top of these disadvantages are the opportunity costs
of lawyers-requiring the employment of more legal advisors
inevitably reduces the availability of scientific advisors, given limited
budgets.
The presence of judicial review, at least under prevailing
approaches, requires a considerable increase in legal analysis with all
of its costs; much of this increase should be unnecessary. Under the
current system, agencies facing judicial review must not merely strive
to ascertain the authentic meaning of the law, but also must anticipate
and respond to the range of alternative meanings that might appeal to
any given review panel. The agency also must devote resources to
procedural and other administrative law requirements. Nicholas
Zeppos has exposed how even the deferential Chevron rule produces
this misallocation:
29
The significance of Chevron step one would lead the agency
to devote more resources to the legalistic analysis that was at
the core of Chevron step one than to policy expertise or
political balancing.... Therefore, scarce agency resources
would be shifted away from explanations that a court and
the public might find more helpful.... [T]ime, space and
expertise limits may lead the agency lawyer to emphasize
the law over the policy.
30
As the explanation of the rule tilts toward legalism, so does
power within the agency. Zeppos observes that the Chevron analysis
126. Id. at 118.
127. Id. at 120.
128. Id. at 121.
129. The Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), directed that courts defer to some agency
interpretations of statutes. The opinion stated that courts should reverse such
interpretations only if: (1) the statute is clearly contrary to the interpretation; or (2) the
statute is vague, but the interpretation is nevertheless unreasonable. See id. at 843-44.
The decision has been interpreted as a noteworthy declaration of deference to agencies.
See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2162-64
(1998) (summarizing Chevron and analyzing its implications).
130. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Problems of
Commitment, Non-Contractibility, and the Proper Incentives, 44 DuKE L.J., 1133, 1147-48
(1995); see also WILSON, supra note 33, at 281 (observing that the courts changed "a
political discussion of policy and discretion into a legal discussion of rights and
procedures").
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has caused a transfer of power to lawyers within agencies and to the
Department of Justice, which must ultimately defend the rules
promulgated."' Regulations are formulated "in a political
environment that makes it more important to withstand legal attack
than to withstand scientific scrutiny."'132 This consequence is surely a
distortion; Congress did not delegate regulatory authority to EPA in
order to empower Justice Department litigators.
EPA is probably the best example of the disadvantages of
judicial review. As a practical matter, lawyers "have the last word in
most EPA actions," rewriting regulations as necessary to survive
judicial review.33 Other agencies, however, have suffered similarly.
For example, OSHA standard setting has become a battle between
experts who seek to act quickly and lawyers who seek to make the
best case for judicial review."3 Under a regime of judicial review, the
lawyers tend to win; the power and authority of scientific experts are
concomitantly decreased. The obvious result is regulation with less
scientific backing and an increasingly adversarial legal environment.135
The same is true of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). Richard Pierce observed that FERC, to comply with
judicial requirements, hired more lawyers in lieu of engineers and
economists, but such a "reallocation of resources ... elevate[d]
apparent quality of decisiomaking over actual quality of
decisionmaking.' 1 36 Similarly, legal efforts to compel the Office of
Civil Rights to focus its resources on integration of higher education
caused the Office "to ... neglect ... improving actual educational
performance among blacks.' 37
Legal adversarialism also may undermine regulatory
effectiveness in indirect ways. Professors Pildes and Sunstein
131. See Zeppos, supra note 130, at 1148-49.
132. WILSON, supra note 33, at 284.
133. O'LEARY, supra note 69, at 164; see also Patricia M. Wald, The Role of the
Judiciary in Environmental Protection, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 519, 534 (1992)
(reporting that "agencies often draft their rules and rationales with judicial review in
mind").
134. See EISNER, supra note 91, at 159.
135. See James V. DeLong, New Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the
Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REv. 399, 424 (1986) (observing that "like any other
institution, a court may tend to place too much weight on the values with which it is most
familiar-a court may overemphasize formalized procedures" to the detriment of scientific
analysis).
136. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules:
How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L.
REV. 7,27 (1991).
137. RABKIN, supra note 39, at 180.
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emphasize the importance of public trust to effective regulation.38
Yet they also note that such trust is fragile and that the bureaucracy
dedicated to the regulation of public risks largely has lost the public
trust.139 This loss is attributed in material part to the "tendency to
resolve policy conflicts in adversarial settings, particularly
litigation."' Legal analysis is obviously essential to regulation, and
agency lawyers offer benefits as well as costs. But there is a desirable
balance of legal resources-more is not always better-and judicial
review has spurred agencies to devote exorbitant levels of resources
to lawyering, thereby unleashing "an excessive focus on process
rather than the substance of governmental decisions."'
4'
D. Ignorance of Political and Practical Constraints
Judicial review consistently ignores the external political and
practical factors that must lie at the heart of effective administrative
action. Appellate arguments concentrate on the interests of the
particular litigating parties and the specific legal provision at issue.
Yet "[f]or a regulatory scheme to succeed, the agency must look
beyond the impact of its decision on the immediate parties to the
proceeding."'4 The agency must consider the practical consequences
of the decision on its entire agenda, as well as the political
consequences of action or inaction.
Judges commonly misinterpret the political nature of the statutes
they are asked to interpret. For example, environmental statutes
often contain broad, aspirational, pro-environmental language, yet
also include significant restrictive exceptions as a political
compromise. 43 In many cases, judges often miss the compromise
because their efforts at textual interpretation "tend to devalue the
policy balances struck by environmental agencies between broad pro-
environmental aspirational language and narrow pro-industry
exceptions."'" A judicial decision may dwell on the wording of a
given section of a statute without considering the purpose and
138. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CH. L. REV. 1, 40-43 (1995).
139. See id. at 41.
140. Id. at 42.
141. Loren A. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 427,429.
142. Seidenfeld, supra note 43, at 492-93.
143. See Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-
Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better Than Judicial
Liberalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1231, 1251-52 (1996).
144. Id. at 1267.
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operation of the overall statutory scheme. With their abstract, even
Olympian perspective, judges lack agencies' ability "to judge the
administrability, enforceability, and likely consequences of new
policies" so as to produce a "workable regulatory scheme."145
Political realities critically constrain and direct agency
decisionmaking 46 An agency "must consider how it will enforce its
standards and what problems implementation of the standards will
cause."' 7 Courts are poorly positioned to appreciate and respond to
such political realities."4  More seriously, court intervention may
attempt to deny the unavoidable presence of such political realities.
For example, to satisfy judicial decisions, agencies may be forced to
develop meaningless regulations that will never be effected. Courts
also distort the political realities. A study of the FTC found that the
adversarial administrative process compelled by procedural
requirements discouraged political conflict resolution because
"judicialized procedures have made it difficult for the FTC to fashion
politically acceptable policies.' 1 49 Likewise, fear of judicial review
and courts' failure to consider political reality "denied [EPA] the
opportunity to create a functional regulatory program [for hazardous
air pollutants] and advanced few, if any, of Congress'[s] substantive
goals." '  Courts are also slow to respond to shifts in politics.
Agencies' ability "to reformulate policies and interpretations as
political administrations change is often a tremendous advantage in
achieving an interpretation that can maintain majoritarian political
support.5'
5'
Likewise, judicial review can sometimes ignore the political
realities surrounding agencies' enforcement powers. For example,
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) sought to
strengthen the Clean Air Act by obtaining court orders requiring
EPA to disallow state variances under Clean Air Act standards. The
reviewing courts, however, were "woefully uninformed about the
145. John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233,
311 (1990).
146. See id. at 315 (suggesting that the "press, popular support, and potential political
consequences are important factors at most stages of regulatory decisions").
147. Seidenfeld, supra note 43, at 493. A court, by contrast, "need not concern itself
with any of these matters." Id.
148. See MELNICK, supra note 38, at 297 (explaining how "court decisions have
squandered valuable administrative time and political capital").
149. WEST, supra note 30, at 173.
150. Dwyer, supra note 145, at 236.
151. Mank, supra note 143, at 1284.
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informal constraints on ... EPA's enforcement program."152 James
Q. Wilson explains the effects of this environmental "victory":
The courts and the NRDC thought they had closed a
loophole; in fact they had gutted an incentive. The states,
irritated by the EPA order complying with the court rulings,
reduced their enforcement efforts, substituted informal for
formal procedures, and refused to cooperate with much of
... EPA's program. To the states, the federal government
had displayed a head-in-the-clouds ignorance of the
complexity and variety of local pollution problems and had
taken out of the states' hands a vital incentive that could be
used to induce industry compliance with the clean-air
program. In short, a series of court decisions intended to
toughen the enforcement of anti-pollution law in fact
weakened it.
153
Unable to provide variances, the states halted enforcement efforts or
adopted informal compliance methods, which reduced oversight by
the public and EPA.54 These decisions were not only politically
uninformed, they were also legally "wrong"-they were later
reversed by the Supreme Court. 5 By then, however, the damage had
already been done. 5 6 The key point is that the court took the politics
out of a fundamentally political issue, forcing it into a painful, legal
Procrustean bed.
Courts also may ignore the practical realities of scientific
limitations. Regulatory decisionmaking typically requires the use of
scientific evidence, ranging from epidemiology to economics. A
public health regulation, for example, may depend upon biological
evidence of toxicity, statistical evidence of risk, engineering evidence
regarding control technology, and perhaps economic evidence of
compliance costs. Yet science seldom offers conclusive answers, and
even if conclusive answers might be achievable, regulators lack the
resources to find them. In this context, Professor McGarity suggests
that agencies should employ a "rationality that recognizes the
limitations that inadequate data, unquantifiable values, mixed societal
goals, and political realities place on the capacity of structured
rational thinking, and it does the best that it can with what it has.'
57
152. MELNICK, supra note 38, at 191.
153. WILSON, supra note 33, at 288; see also MELNICK, supra note 38, at 178
(describing the decision as an "environmental disaster").
154. See MELNICK, supra note 38, at 190.
155. See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60,98-99 (1975).
156. See MELNICK, supra note 38, at 185.
157. THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
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Courts, however, may demand perfection. In a given case, only
the merits of a single piece of regulation are before the court, causing
tunnel vision that eliminates contextual consideration. The court
typically sees only the challenged regulation, not the tradeoffs with
other actions. A "common theme[" of judicial review "is the
inability and unwillingness of... court[s] to factor... agenc[ies'] lack
of staff and budget in its decision."' 58 Absent recognition of resource
constraints, it is natural to demand perfection. But "[d]emanding the
utmost care on ancillary issues can have the perverse effect of
precluding agency regulation altogether."'59
OSHA provides a telling example of this effect of judicial review.
The agency "had a relatively small number of officials in its office of
standards development," who were distracted by the threat of judicial
review.'" As the burdens of rulemaking expanded, OSHA's
frequency of rulemaking plummeted. OSHA has been significantly
slower in setting new standards than are its "counterparts in other
countries."'' Yet OSHA has been a relative success when compared
to other agencies. For example, after the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) suffered a reversal in its attempts to ban certain
formaldehyde insulation, the CPSC abandoned all efforts to set
standards for toxic products.162 In this case, judicial review did not
slow the regulatory process, it halted it.
Demanding synoptic analysis fails to consider the costs
associated with such analysis and whether the associated resources
might be more profitably spent on another matter. The nature of
science makes synopticism especially troublesome. There are no final
scientific answers, only tentative ones. Science, by its nature, is
always questioning, always exploring. The closer courts come to
demanding that agency science provide a conclusive answer to
scientific questions, the closer they come to demanding the
impossible. Reviewing each case in isolation, judges are wont to
demand optimization or a synoptic model. The agency, they reason,
should consider every alternative and each piece of evidence
thoroughly. While this model may improve an individual rule, it
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 5-6 (1991).
158. O'LEARY, supra note 69, at 113; see also Seidenfeld supra note 43, at 493 (noting
that a court's "legal vantage point" has the effect of "diminish[ing] technical or practical
constraints that the agency faces").
159. Seidenfeld, supra note 43, at 497.
160. RABKN, supra note 39, at 224.
161. Id. at 228.
162. See McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying," supra note 20, at 1419 (noting
that the "CPSC has not attempted to regulate a single additional toxic product.").
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worsens the overall body of rules:
Synopticism is not totally rational, because it fails to take
decision costs into account. If an agency must know
everything before it can make a rule, then the cost of
rulemaking will, in some instances, be unbearable. And in
many instances the rule either will be greatly delayed or will
never appear at all. Either everything can't be known or
new things to be found out keep popping up faster than
everything can be known about them.163
In short, judges hold agencies to unreasonably high standards for
individual regulations, thereby preventing agencies from carrying out
their essential mandates. This effect is but one of many examples of
how judicial tunnel vision focused on an individual case can disrupt
sensible polycentric planning and cause unanticipated perverse
consequences. 16
Judicial intervention also frustrates agency efforts at
coordination and coherence. A typical organic statute has "hundreds
of provisions" that "relate to other provisions in complicated ways.'
Courts examine the provisions in isolation and may yield a
combination of interpretations that "simply will not work because of
one or more of the many constraints that affect any agency's ability to
perform its mission."'166 A judicial intervention on just one provision
may upset the agency's entire program, when "an externally imposed
construction of one term can force an agency to change its method of
implementing its program in many other ways." 67 Once again, the
lack of polycentrism inherent in judicial review interferes with sound
163. Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court's "Return" to Economic Regulation, 1 STUD.
AM. POL. DEv. 91,114 (1986).
164. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN CoAL/DIRTY AIR
25 (1981) (describing how "the flow of litigation only directed attention away from the
need for long-range planning"); SMITH, supra note 38, at 49 (referring to studies
"indicating that judges frequently do not foresee the adverse consequences of their
decisions").
165. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 764
(1995).
166. Id- These constraints may be various:
Some potential methods of implementing a program will not work because the
agency cannot make the types of factual findings required. Other methods are
impractical because they would require more resources than the agency
possesses, they would create intractable enforcement problems, or they would
anger members of Congress who are in a position to reduce the agency's
appropriations.
Id. at 764 n.110.
167. I& at 765.
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governance. Judge Posner "wonders whether the [Supreme] Court
has any clue as to the consequences of its administrative law decisions
for society."'" When decisions are clueless with respect to practical
and political realities, those decisions may well be ineffective or even
counterproductive. Judicial decisions cannot wish away such realities.
E. Producing Poor Quality Rules
The most common pragmatic defense of judicial review is that,
by demanding better agency analysis and stronger supporting
documentation, it produces fewer rules of better quality.
169
Anecdotal examples can be cited in support of this purported
benefit. 70 Even if conceded, however, improved quality is an
insufficient justification for judicial review if quantity suffers
unduly.17 ' Sidney Shapiro's review of OSHA suggests that judicial
"insistence that the agency prove the obvious diverts precious time
and resources from rulemaking initiatives."'' A marginal increase in
regulation quality (from explicitly proving the obvious) could cause a
substantial decrease in quantity; the net result, therefore, may be an
overall decrease in the quality of regulation. Moreover, judicial
review actually reduces the quality of individual rules in several ways.
In light of these concerns, the occasional benefit in rule quality is
outweighed by the inherent pressure for overlegalization created by
judicial review.
Of course, part of the problem in dealing with this issue is the
difficulty of measuring the net effect of judicial review on rule quality.
Cass Sunstein has sought to perform his own cost-benefit analysis of
judicial review by analyzing the net benefits of various decisions on
agency rules, 73 but his judgment was based largely on his personal
168. Posner, supra note 9, at 961.
169. See, e.g, Pierce, supra note 26, at 85 (observing that some argue that reasoned
decisionmaking review is justified as a tool to improve the quality of agency
decisionmaking); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney,
52 U. CHI. L. REv. 653, 656 (1985) (contending that the threat of judicial review increases
agency fidelity to "substantive and procedural norms").
170. See Lazarus, supra note 100, at 349 (concluding that it was "likely that an active
judiciary improved the quality of EPA decisionmaking in some cases").
171. See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection As a Learning Experience, 27
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 791, 804 (1994) (emphasizing that "improvements in quality come at
the expense of delay and reduced output").
172. Sidney A. Shapiro, Substantive Reform, Judicial Review, and Agency Resources:
OSHA as a Case Study, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 645,654 (1997).
173. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522passim.
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assessment of each decision's benefits and costs.' 4 Even this standard
was not easy for him to apply. For instance, he appeared to include
the Clean Air Act prevention of significant deterioration decision as
an example of both good and bad judicial review.'75
Absent a universally accepted currency for measuring the effects
of judicial review, an empirical study of its net effects on rule quality
will be difficult to operationalize. 176 It is more fruitful to examine the
systemic incentives created by judicial review and their likely effects
on rule quality. By requiring additional scrutiny for particular rules,
one might expect judicial review to produce additional information
and thus to enhance rule quality. 77 Of course, any such enhancement
is seriously undermined if judges tend to impose additional
information requirements when they are ideologically predisposed
against the agency's decision. 8  Moreover, the apparent benefit is
174. See id at 528. For example, Sunstein cites the banning of DDT as an example of
judicial review that produced a "significant benefito." Id Yet the DDT ban may have
caused more health harm than it prevented. See AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT Is IT TRUE?
58, 72 (1995); Cross, supra note 107, at 870-71, 890-91.
175. Compare Sunstein, supra note 173, at 528 (listing the prevention of significant
deterioration (PSD) decision among the significant benefits of judicial review), with iL at
531 (citing adverse effects of the PSD ruling and uncertainty about existence of any
environmental benefit from the decision). The PSD decision probably should be
considered a negative. See MELNICK, supra note 38, at 76 (observing that "PSD has few
friends and more than its share of enemies because it is incredibly cumbersome, causes
unnecessary delays in the construction of industrial facilities, and diverts regulators'
resources from more effective programs"). Sunstein elsewhere appears to subscribe to the
view that the PSD decision was counterproductive. See SUNSTrEIN, supra note 109, at 178-
79 (describing unanticipated adverse effects of the decision, such as "protecting dirty
existing plants against replacement with cleaner new ones"). The PSD decision essentially
placed restrictions on sources located in areas that were well within the ambient air quality
standards at the time. The decision was based on the need to protect the relatively
pristine air quality of these regions. However, it had the perverse effects discussed above,
such as perpetuating pollution in the regions where the problem was greater.
176. See Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 50, at 298 (recognizing that "appraising
the costs and benefits of judicial review can only occur from within a contestable political
perspective"). Sunstein concedes this point, noting that a cost-benefit analysis of judicial
review is complicated by the lack of criteria for assessment. See Sunstein, supra note 173,
at 536.
177. Mark Seidenfeld suggests that, absent judicial review, agencies will have a
tendency to rely unduly on the lead office for a regulation and give insufficient attention
to a broader perspective. See Seidenfeld, supra note 43, at 507. Yet Seidenfeld elsewhere
acknowledges that the political realities of regulation make it unlikely that eliminating
judicial review would materially reduce the outside analyses of rules. See id at 505. The
relationship is more complex than Seidenfeld suggests. While judicial review may add
importance to the views of other divisions within an agency, thus broadening perspective,
it simultaneously disempowers high level agency officers, who have the broadest
perspective of all. See MELNICK, supra note 38, at 382-83 (describing how judicial review
undermined the influence of the EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards).
178. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,
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undermined by other systemic consequences of judicial scrutiny.
Rule quality will suffer from resource misallocation and other
problems. Additional features of judicial review, including emphasis
on procedure over substance, the promotion of adversarial legalism,
and the lack of consideration for the practical consequences of rules,
further conspire to reduce rule quality.
Judicial review focuses agencies on procedural compliance rather
than the merits of the rule.1 79  As Jerry Mashaw has explained,
"[n]othing focuses an administrator's mind more keenly on
recordkeeping, turning square procedural corners, elaborate
justificatory analysis, and a host of other red-tape-producing activities
than the prospect of judicial review."" 0  Judge Wald, formerly a
member of the D.C. Circuit, makes this plain; she notes that remands
"are most often caused by the agency's failure to communicate or
explain to generalist judges what they are doing, not by the agency's
failure to do enough research or garner sufficient expert opinions for
the record."'181 Judicial review does not improve the substance of
regulations, just their explanation to an uninformed judicial audience.
Resources devoted to such procedures and explanations (and
resources devoted to discovering what procedures and explanations
will be required) must be taken from other concerns, such as assessing
a rule's merits or conducting additional rulemaking proceedings. The
procedures may even undermine understanding of the merits, as the
adversarial process "tends to warp the quality of the scientific and
technical information" available to the agency.'8
In theory, judicial review should give agencies an incentive to
make thoughtful rulemaking judgments. The unpredictability of
83 VA. L. Rv. 1717, 1769 (1999) (noting that any benefit of improved quality of
rulemaking "would be diluted if agencies were to believe that the fate of their regulations
depends in large part on the nature of the D.C. Circuit panel that reviews them, rather
than on the care taken to explain the reasons for their actions").
179. See Philip K. Howard, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of
Responsibility, Keynote Address at the American Bar Association Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice Symposium on the 50th Anniversary of the
Administrative Procedures Act (Oct. 1995), in 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 312, 315 (1996).
Howard notes that procedures are justified on the grounds that "'more process means
better decisions.'" Id. In fact, he argues, "more process means more defensiveness, it
means distorted decisions." Id
180. MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 52, at 415.
181. Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in a Time of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 659,
666 (1997).
182. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 21
(1982). Some of the reasons for this warped quality are found in Macey, supra note 122, at
120-25, which observes that the adversary process is inconsistent with scientific truth-
finding.
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courts, though, prevents agencies from protecting their rules in this
fashion. Rather than try to guess what a court will require, the
agency simply may choose to issue a less thoughtful rule and accept
the inevitability of judicial second-guessing. Thus, "[t]he prospect of
judicial review induces the agency to make a questionable or infirm
decision in order to leave the final judgment with the courts."'"
Agency-forcing guidelines can also "impose significant
regulatory inefficiency costs and thereby seriously undermine the
quality of rulemaking."'1  The focus on legalistic concerns comes at
the expense of sound policy. After protracted litigation over EPA
regulation of radionuclides under the Clean Air Act, for example, the
Agency produced "sham regulations that in fact increased the amount
of radionuclides that could be emitted in the air.18 The rules
essentially embraced existing control technologies and practices. 6
Judicial intervention "forced EPA to expend scarce resources to deal
with a problem (non-uranium mine radionuclide emissions) that did
not merit being regulated."' 7 Even if the problem had in fact merited
regulation, the judiciary could not effectively force the Agency to
take action that it disliked, so the Agency produced sham regulations
that conformed to the legal requirements of the opinion, yet lacked
practical effect."
Judicial review also skews the outcome of regulation in an
unnecessarily antagonistic fashion. Legalistic adversarialism is
incompatible with collaborative approaches to regulation. Under the
current regime, rulemaking participants "dig in and defend their
extreme positions.' ' 9  Agencies become unwilling "to experiment
with flexible or temporary rules."' 90 When EPA successfully created
voluntary testing approaches under the Toxic Substances Control
Act,19 the action was challenged by environmental interests and
183. Sanford E. Gaines, Decisionmaking Procedures at the Environmental Protection
Agency, 62 IOWA L. REv. 839, 899 (1977) (basing his conclusion on "[s]tatements of
present and former EPA employees").
184. Abbott, supra note 91, at 195; see also McGarity, Some Thoughts on
"Deossifying," supra note 20, at 1456 (noting that "[w]hen agencies work feverishly under
the threat of statutory or judicially imposed deadlines, the quality of the output may
suffer").
185. O'LEARY, supra note 69, at 113.
186. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Standards for
Radionuclides, 50 Fed. Reg. 5190,5192 (1985) (current version at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
187. Abbott, supra note 91, at 190.
188. See id. at 189-90.
189. Harter, supra note 182, at 19.
190. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying," supra note 20, at 1392.
191. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified
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struck down. 192 Efforts to replace the voluntary approach with a more
adversarial testing system proved futile and delayed the program
considerably.193 Likewise, in NHTSA and other agencies, the
"willingness of the courts to second-guess the agency has also
reinforced the adversarial posture of parties."1 94 The result is to
exclude compromise solutions, even when they might be preferable to
picking a winner,95 as compromise solutions typically are. Strict legal
action "often engenders legalistic defensiveness and costly court
battles," while "[e]ffective regulation requires cooperative problem-
solving, elicited by negotiation about the sensible application of legal
rules.'
1 96
Agency-forcing judicial decisions, driven by extreme litigation
positions and unrepresentative circumstances, 197 tend to produce
particularly extreme standards. This result is illustrated by decisions
such as those striking down efforts by both EPA and the FDA to
moderate the extreme and counterproductive Delaney Clause. 8
Similar extreme results were compelled by the decision holding that
National Ambient Air Quality Standards were to be set without any
regard for their cost or achievability.' 99 Even the threat of such
judicial outcomes can skew agency decisionmaking, for instance,
because the expense and likelihood of being reversed in court creates
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
192. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. 1255, 1260
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that EPA's program of negotiating voluntary testing agreements
for various chemicals subverted the statutory scheme laid out by TSCA, which sought to
impose formal procedures for testing chemicals on which data were lacking).
193. See O'LEARY, supra note 69, at 80-85.
194. MAsHAW, supra note 34, at 164.
195. See Gerald F. Anderson, The Courts and Health Policy: Strengths and Limitations,
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1992, at 98 (observing that "[s]ince the courts must select winners
and losers, it is unlikely that a compromise solution will evolve from a court decision,"
even though "a compromise outcome may be preferable"); Horowitz, supra note 81, at 98
(contrasting the reasoning of judicial decisionmaking with other modes of decision, such as
"negotiation and compromise").
196. Robert A. Kagan, Regulatory Enforcement, in HANDBOOK OF REGULATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 71, at 383, 385; see also BRUCE YANDLE, THE
POLITICAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 71 (1989) (describing how
extremely costly regulations make it easier for industry to evade sanctions for violations),
197. See MELNICK, supra note 38, at 15 (noting that private control over litigation
means that the courts are often presented with "highly atypical cases").
198. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1992) (striking down EPA's attempt
to rationalize the Delaney Clause and reduce risk); Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (striking down similar efforts by the FDA). In these cases, both agencies
sought to evade the extreme requirements of the Delaney Clause by using a de minimis
risk exception.
199. See Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130,1150 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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incentives for agencies to announce stringent standards.2°
As courts require stricter individual standards, the number of
overall standards declines, as does the public health protection
offered by the cumulation of standards.20 1 This principle is known as
overregulation causing underregulation.2 2  John Mendeloff has
demonstrated how the principle has operated at OSHA.2 3 In its early
days, OSHA embraced exposure levels suggested in the voluntary
industry standards developed by the American Conference of
Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). By relying on the work
of these outside experts, the Agency was able to regulate hundreds of
chemicals.2° OSHA subsequently tried to set much stricter standards
for such substances, but was only successful with respect to ten
chemicals.20 5 During the same period, ACGIH lowered its standards
for another hundred chemicals, and the combined health benefits of
the superficially more lenient ACGIH approach were considerably
greater.20 6
OSHA's failings are not attributable to administrative
misjudgment; judicial review was central to the underregulation. One
factor that "prevented OSHA from speeding up its standard setting
was its insistence on adopting the most protective standards
feasible-a disposition, reinforced by court decisions and advocacy
groups, that continued throughout the 1980s. '' 207 The court had the
naive theory that "greater protection for workers would follow
automatically from more stringent statutory requirements," when in
fact "stringent requirements tend to lead an agency not to regulate at
all, thus producing underregulation."208
The risk of extreme overregulatory judicial commands may deter
200. See MASHAW, supra note 34, at 164.
201. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 173, at 526 (noting that the "courts' literal approach
to the Delaney Clause has increased regulatory irrationality by imposing serious costs and
in fact bringing about fewer rather than more improvements in safety and health").
202. For a general review of this problem, see CROSS, supra note 99, at 144-45.
203. See generally JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF ToXIc SUBSTANCE
REGULATION: HoW OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA
(1988) (tracing the history of various OSHA regulatory efforts).
204. See id. at 82 (noting OSHA's adoption of ACGIH standards for the regulation of
hundreds of chemicals).
205. See John Mendeloff, Regulatory Reform and OSHA Policy, 5 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 440, 442 (1986). The typical exposure reduction from the ACGIH standards
was 50%, while OSHA sought a 90% reduction in exposures. See iL
206. See id. (reporting that ACGIH actions promised to save several hundred more
lives than the OSHA actions).
207. RABKIN, supra note 39, at 229.
208. Sunstein, supra note 173, at 532.
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all regulation. If courts insist that "regulation, once undertaken, must
be draconian, the government avoids regulating many substances at
all."2"9 This effect is illustrated by the regulation of hazardous air
pollutants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act (before the 1990
amendments). EPA feared that courts would interpret the law
strictly, requiring zero-risk regulation without respect to cost, which
in turn made the Agency reluctant to take any action on hazardous
air pollutants.210  As a consequence, section 112 was broadly
considered a failure.2 ' EPA's efforts to interpret the section in a
workable fashion were deterred by fear of judicial review.2" This
experience provides another example of how apparently protective
judicial review perversely undermines the protective goals of statutes
by deterring regulation. Similar results obtained under section 4 of
the Toxic Substances Control Act.
2 13
Even the fewer, stricter standards actually promulgated may be
relatively ineffective-stricter standards "are harder to enforce than
standards that seem more reasonable. '21 4 Industry resistance will be
greater and compliance will suffer.2 5 States, Congress, and the
President may balk at enforcing rules that threaten major employers.
209. SUNSTEIN, supra note 109, at 92.
210. See EPA's Air Pollution Control Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 19
(1983) (Sup. Doc. No. Y 4.En2/3:98-97) (testimony of William Ruckelsbaus,
Administrator) (declaring that agency fear of literal statutory interpretation leads to
"paralysis in decisionmaking"); Clean Air Act (Part Two): Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 737
(1981) (Sup. Doc. No. Y 4.En2/3:97-103) (statement of Walter C. Barber, Jr., Director,
Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards) (reporting that the potential for extreme
interpretation had made the agency "reluctant to list chemicals" as hazardous air
pollutants); Applegate, supra note 32, at 314 (noting that stringency prevented regulation,
which meant that "the most hazardous air pollutants were not regulated at all"); Frank B.
Cross, Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: A New Approach to the Control of Airborne
Carcinogens, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 215, 226 (1986) (reporting that EPA avoided
full implementation of section 112 in order to avoid overly stringent judicial review).
211. See Cross, supra note 210, at 215-18.
212. See id. at 226-27; see also Dwyer, supra note 145, at 279-81 (noting that fear of
judicial enforcement of severe standards polarized the interested parties and prevented an
effective compromise solution); Graham, supra note 68, at 131 (reporting that fear of
severe standards paralyzed EPA decisionmaking).
213. See John Mendeloff, Does Overregulation Cause Underregulation? The Case of
Toxic Substances, REGULATION, Sept./Oct. 1981, at 47, 50 (reporting that stringent
requirements limited EPA to regulating two or three substances annually).
214. MEUNICK, supra note 38, at 297.
215. See Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of
Health/Health Analysis, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 729, 780 n.281 (1995) (citing sources indicating
that more extreme regulations produce public backlash, increase industry resistance to
compliance, and reduce government compliance efforts).
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The courts themselves may further this result, striking down the very
stringent standards that they originally demanded.2 16 In the context
of air pollution transportation controls, "the federal courts
contributed to ... EPA's problems by ordering it to formulate
aggressive attainment plans and then, once the implications of the
original orders became clear, refusing to help ... EPA enforce
them." '217 Even if the rules are sustained in court, the cost of
defending them hampers agencies,21 8 and the resulting adversarialism
may undermine the goals of the statutory program.21 9 Finally, when
extreme standards are implemented, they increase the probability of
creating countervailing risks that exceed those prevented by the
regulation 20
The costs of judicialization and the domination of judicial
policymaking by extreme positions also frustrates innovative and
potentially more effective regulatory approaches.22' When agencies
take any action at all, they are encouraged to "play it safe" and hew
close to the existing law and past practices. For instance, because of
216. See FREDERICK ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT
THiROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 15 (1977) (noting that particularly costly government
requirements mean that "a firm can reasonably expect to make a convincing case in court
about the infeasibility or unreasonableness of the agency's emission requirements").
217. MELNICK, supra note 38, at 301.
218. See Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, "More Good Than Harm" A First
Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379, 388
(1993) (observing that the efforts to "defend overly stringent regulations that provide
limited extra benefits at high marginal costs" require agencies to "expend both resources
and precious political capital" that would be better devoted to greater problems).
219. See, e.g., John T. Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of
Administrative Effectiveness, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 115, 128-33 (1991) (finding that
cooperative enforcement was more effective than adversarial enforcement and concluding
that labor involvement in regulation setting, which magnified the adversarial nature of the
process, actually reduced the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement).
220. See generally Cross, supra note 107 (discussing the dangers of attempting to avoid
known risks without considering the costs and other implications of the avoidance efforts).
Regulating a given risk may simply produce the use of alternatives that have a greater risk,
such as when energy regulations have caused a switch to hazardous fossil fuels or even
more hazardous conservation measures. See id. at 863-82. Regulating a risky substance or
activity also may cause harms by forcing the public to forego the benefits provided by that
substance or activity, as when rigorous standards for new drugs cause a delay in the
marketing of beneficial drugs. See id. at 882-97. Regulation may even cause harms
directly, when the activities taken in furtherance of the regulations produce risks, as when
cleanups initiated under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) endanger workers. See id. at 898-908.
221. Cf. Applegate, supra note 32, at 314 (reviewing how stringent policies can limit
innovation); Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 50, at 301 (discussing how judicial review
thwarts implementation of "innovative approaches to substantive problems"); McGarity,
Some Thoughts on "Deossifying," supra note 20, at 1452-53 (observing that "stringent
substantive judicial review can hamper innovation and experimentation").
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"the threat of judicial review," EPA frequently seeks to set standards
adapted to incremental changes in existing technology, "even though
an overhaul and modernization may be more efficient."''  As a
result, polarization among competing interest groups has frustrated
promising pollution prevention and market incentive programs.2 By
empowering factions, judicial review discourages market-based
regulation.? 4
The obstruction of more efficient, market-oriented regulatory
methods has the effect of adding additional and unnecessary costs to
the enormous sums already spent for pollution control.2 Current
regulatory methods produce tens of billions of dollars of economic
waste? 6  Some commentators suggest that the amount of waste is
even greater and that more efficient regulatory strategies could save
hundreds of billions of dollars in pollution control regulation alone. 2 7
Limited existing efforts at using market-based regulatory methods
have already shown significant savings.M
Frustrating efficient innovations also undermines the
effectiveness of existing regulation. EPA Administrator Carol
Browner has remarked: "'If we are to clean up our air, we need to
move beyond the one-size-fits-all approach and work toward
flexibility and innovation-solutions that work for real people, real
communities.' "9 Current command and control approaches suffer
222. Marianne Lavelle, Some Costs Benefit Companies, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 27, 1995, at
Al.
223. See Lazarus, supra note 100, at 362-63 (concluding that "polarization of
institutional forces has ... prevented any meaningful effort to implement these alternative
approaches").
224. See Michael S. Greve, Introduction: Environmental Politics Without Romance, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC CosTs, PRIVATE REWARDS 1, 7 (Michael S. Greve
& Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) (describing how market standards are contrary to the
interests of producers and how technology-based standards benefit technology
manufacturers).
225. See, e.g., Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 138, at 97-99 (describing the inefficiencies
of traditional command and control regulatory approaches).
226. See Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing
Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 588 (1996) (estimating that traditional command and
control methods cost twice as much as efficient regulatory methods). Stewart estimates
the amount of waste as "tens of billions of dollars annually." Id.
227. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 138, at 97 (noting that between 1972 and 1985,
the United States spent more than $600 billion on pollution control and estimating that the
gains from this expenditure might have been achieved for only 25% of the cost, had more
efficient methods been employed).
228. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 260-61 (1996) (summarizing research on the extent of actual
and projected savings of such programs).
229. Air Pollution: EPA Administrator Will Not Fight Bill to Repeal FIP Requirements
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from insufficient information, intermittent overregulation and
underregulation, failure to adapt to local circumstances, inability to
integrate control efforts, and failure to provide an incentive for
technological advances in pollution controlP3o Market incentive
regulation can offer more environmental benefit than do classic
command and control regulationsP 1 For example, the market-based
acid rain control program, which was adopted pursuant to explicit
statutory direction, has proved more effective than traditional
command and control regulations at much less cost 32 Market-based
approaches may be a win-win scenario, offering more control at less
cost, but the possibility of obtaining these benefits may be frustrated
by judicial review because it precludes innovation and serves to
aggravate the worst aspects of command and control regulation. 33
Negotiated rulemaking is another type of potentially beneficial
regulatory innovation that has been frustrated by the adversarial
legalism that judicial review promotes. The confining structure of the
APA and the adversarial culture it inculcates make regulatory
negotiation difficult, if not impossible.P Negotiated rulemaking may
in 1977 Law, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1998 (Feb. 17, 1995) (quoting Administrator
Browner).
230. See Stewart, supra note 226, at 588-89; see also SUNSTErN, supra note 109, at 88
(observing that command and control technology regulations perpetuate old plants, fail to
encourage new technology, and prevent the government from developing sensible
priorities). Sunstein reports that "[t]here is considerable evidence that the government
could accomplish its antipollution goals far more effectively through decentralized,
incentive-based strategies that are focused on pollution reduction rather than on the
means of achieving that end, and that also rely on market incentives." See SUNSTEIN,
supra note 109, at 88.
231. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 109, at 87-88; J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The
Arrow of the Law in Modem Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal
the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 405, 452-81 (1997) (discussing generally the shortcomings of
command and control environmental regulation); Norman W. Spaulding HI,
Commodification and Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the Promise of Market
Incentives, 16 STAN. ENvrL. J. 293, 295 (1997) (suggesting that "tradable pollution
permits may hold great promise for reducing air pollution more effectively than command
and control regimes").
232. See Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis
of the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,411, 10,419
(1996) (concluding that the tradable permit acid rain program is more effective than prior
command and control approaches); Rick Santorum, Linking Our Land and Our Liberty,
18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 455, 460 (1997) (observing that the acid rain program has led
to a 50% reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions and has cut costs by two-thirds).
233. See Stewart, supra note 226, at 590-91 (reporting that the "dysfunctions of our
command centered environmental regulatory system are exacerbated by the adversary
culture ... and the legal superimposition of formalized decisionmaking procedures, and
searching judicial review over the central planning process").
234. See S. REP. No. 101-97, at 6 (1989) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:seriall3924) (reporting
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offer a variety of advantages to society and affected parties 3
Regulatory negotiation offers the promise of better information in
rulemaking2 6 "may be less costly and more expeditious," and "may
even result in 'better' regulations that take into account important
practical details and respond to varying needs." 2 7  Congress has
recognized the value of the method and has encouraged it
statutorily.18 While regulatory negotiation is not appropriate for all
circumstances, the process provides a valuable option that is largely
foreclosed by APA judicial review.
Quality rulemaking is further undermined by the generalist
judiciary's lack of scientific and technical sophistication. This
relatively common criticism of the judiciary emphasizes that
generalist judges "lack information and may also lack the experience
and skill to interpret such information as they may receive." 239 The
adjudication process exacerbates the ill-informed nature of judicial
review.24  One can find concessions of this point by judges who
choose to defer agencies' positions. But when judges disagree with
agencies' policy results, humility turns to arrogance; "many judges
have been unwilling to acknowledge their lack of expertise" as they
"have routinely opined on the quality of the evidence and on the
that "agencies are confused about how to reconcile negotiated rulemaking procedures
with the APA and the Federal Advisory Committee Act"); Harter, supra note 182, at 102-
03 (noting that a stringent standard of judicial review can undermine innovative
procedures such as negotiated rulemaking); Philip J. Harter, The Political Legitimacy and
Judicial Review of Consensual Rules, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 471, 485 (1983) (reporting that
hard look judicial review could defeat the benefits of consensual rulemaking and inhibit its
use); Andrew F. Popper, Administrative Law in the 21st Century, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 187,
191 (1997) (reporting that "[n]egotiated and hybrid rulemaking struggle to survive in the
land of the APA").
235. See generally Harter, supra note 182, at 28-31 (cataloging the benefits of
negotiated rulemaking). In conventional rulemaking, the agency publishes a proposal,
takes comments from all interested parties, and publishes a final rule. See id. In
negotiated rulemaking, the agency sits down with the most centrally interested parties,
perhaps an industry being regulated and a prominent public interest group, and works out
a final rule that all parties find acceptable. See id. While negotiated rulemaking is not
necessarily universally or even generally desirable, it may be very well suited for certain
regulatory controversies.
236. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies:
Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEO. L.J. 1625, 1627 (1986).
237. Harter, supra note 234, at 489.
238. See The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998).
239. HOROWrrZ, supra note 37, at 31.
240. See id (remarking that the "adjudication process conspires in a dozen small and
large ways to keep the judge ignorant of social context").
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scientific and economic foundations of agencies' actions." '' For
example, the D.C. Circuit prohibited a de minimis polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCB) exemption, floridly writing that "[h]uman beings
have finally come to recognize that they must eliminate or control life
threatening chemicals, such as PCBs, if the miracle of life is to
continue and if earth is to remain a living planet."242 Such dramatic
language is hardly scientific, and in reality restricting PCBs has
proved to be unnecessary and counterproductive.243 Regardless of the
merits of any particular case, there is a systemic problem when judges
make policy decisions without comprehending the relevant policy
issues or the relevant evidence.2 "
The case-by-case nature of judicial review also frustrates
coherent policymaking.2 45 Review is inescapably "piecemeal" and
"unlikely to advance the objective of coordinating an increasingly
complex environmental policy, let alone of coordinating it with other
pressing items on the domestic or foreign policy agendas." Courts'
decisions are dependent on cases, as chosen by private litigants. The
policy "outcome of important cases" can be decided by the "accident
of who gets to court first."247
Judicial review is il-suited to evaluate the policy consequences of
judicial decisions.2  Consider, for example, a review of Nuclear
Regulatory Commission policy. Challenges to the policy will center
entirely on the narrow risk of nuclear power being regulated.249 The
challenge, however, will not consider the most important question-
241. EISNER, supra note 91, at 169; see also MELNICK, supra note 38, at 14 (noting that
judicial "independence can breed arrogance," as "[j udges may simply impose their policy
preferences on administrators").
242. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
243. See WILDAVSKY, supra note 174, at 38-55.
244. See MELNICK, supra note 38, at 371 (noting that judges reviewing EPA "came to
their policy-based decisions without using the adjudicatory process to investigate policy
issues").
245. See RABKIN, supra note 39, at 32 (noting that "judicial protection for particular
interest group claims excludes various policies from general efforts to integrate or
coordinate policy operations: it encourages fragmented or incoherent policy efforts").
246. Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 50, at 301.
247. MELNICK, supra note 38, at 15.
248. See Anderson supra note 195, at 98 (noting that "judges do not always have the
tools to discover unintended consequences of their decisions"); Einer R. Elhauge, Does
Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 80 (1991)
(observing that "courts tend to underweigh, or be underinformed about, the systemic and
prospective consequences of their decisions because they focus on the particular parties
and adjudicated historical facts before them").
249. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 940
F.2d 679, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Union of Concerned Scientists v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 920 F.2d 50,55 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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the net risk from power generation. Striving to prevent a small risk
from nuclear power can cause a shift to other sources, such as coal
burning, that will produce a greater risk overall."0 By considering
risks in isolation, courts cannot produce a sensible overall risk
policy."' Even worse, courts have no method to monitor, detect, and
correct perverse consequences that may result from their decisions.252
There is a growing recognition that efforts to regulate risks in
isolation may create greater overall risks5 3 Such countervailing
increases in risk may result from the risks created by alternatives to
the regulated substance or activity, when regulation causes use of a
harmful substitute. Countervailing increases may also result from
ignoring the health benefits foregone in consequence of the
regulation when a regulated substance has overlooked benefits
exceeding the risk. Finally, increases may also result from risks
created directly by regulatory remediation requirements and through
other channels.5 4  Agencies' single-mission orientation sometimes
leads them to make the same types of counterproductive decisions.55
However, judicial review that focuses on isolated statutory provisions
is even more susceptible to the tendency. An agency with a relatively
broad overall mission, such as EPA, is more likely to adopt a sensible,
polycentric vision of overall risk than is a court confronted with
evidence regarding only a single regulation.56 The "litigation setting
... magnifies the possibility of unanticipated consequences that a
250. See Cross, supra note 107, at 852.
251. See Matthew McCubbins et al., Positive and Normative Models of Procedural
Rights, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 307, 328 (1990) (describing how judicial review of Nuclear
Regulatory Commission approvals largely destroyed the nuclear industry but in so doing
the courts "may well have been blind to (or unconcerned with) the policy significance of
its procedural requirements").
252. See Horowitz, supra note 81, at 99.
253. See, e.g., JoHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RISK VERSUS RISK:
TRADE-OFFs IN PROTECrING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT passim (1995)
(presenting a series of case studies demonstrating how efforts to reduce one risk have
produced a greater countervailing risk).
254. See Cross, supra note 107, at 862-908 (cataloging cases in which regulation
resulted in a net increase in risk).
255. See BREYER, supra note 35, at 11-19.
256. See GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 253, at 260 (remarking that the "courts have
not.., been a reliable source of leadership for more intelligent management of society's
risk portfolio" and that "expert agencies are far better equipped for this task than are
generalist judges with small staffs and little ability to collect data or monitor results");
Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 107 (1983)
(observing that courts are "ill-equipped for 'social cost accounting,' "because "courts lack
the administrator's presumed investigative resources, analytic competence, and technical
literacy" and must "view social policy issues through the refracting prism of judicial
review").
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more comprehensive view might perceive and attempt to limit or
control." 7
A final way in which judicial review negatively impacts
regulatory quality is through its tendency to produce only tentative
rules. The theory that more extensive judicial participation and
analysis will yield the "one right rule" reflects an unrealistic
assumption of certainty. In a world of uncertainty, no rule is
unquestionably right or perfectly defensible. The search for a rule
defensible in court, therefore, does not focus the agency on the best
rule, but instead drives agencies to adopt the most defensible rule.
McGarity has found that the "overall effect of evaluative hard look
review is not so much to force the agencies to deal with uncertainty as
it is to force agencies to be more timid in advancing their statutory
missions" 58 because agencies may be more inclined to adopt the
provisions that have not been seriously challenged in the rulemaking
record. Moreover, there "is little sense of finality about an agency
decision, and this may weaken the agency's incentive to take seriously
its responsibilities." 9 Because judicial decisions are unpredictable,
review does not create an incentive for "better" rules, just safer ones.
In short, judicial review of rulemaking is ill-designed for either
wise policy or implementation of the laws. The tendencies noted
above may sometimes cancel each other out, and yield a good rule,
but such an event is merely lucky happenstance. Over all, judicial
review has "substantially emasculated environmental control
programs in the past decade."'" Similar adverse effects have been
felt on highway safety programs, occupational safety programs,
consumer product safety programs, electricity regulation, and other
administrative regimes. Judicial review functionally undermines the
substance of the law by pledging fealty to its letter. The resulting
effects on administrative programs alone should be sufficient to
dejustify judicial review.
III. THE ILLEGITIMATE PUBLIC CHOICE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
RULEMAKING
The defense of judicial review may ultimately retreat to a
democratic position. After all, Congress authorized judicial review in
the Administrative Procedure Act and in various organic statutes.
257. HORowrrz, supra note 37, at 37.
258. McGarity, Ossification of Rulemaking, supra note 20, at 556.
259. JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 390 (1980).
260. Latin, supra note 65, at 133 (1988).
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Some might argue that such a congressional command is compelling,
notwithstanding the policy detriments associated with judicial review.
Moreover, judicial review is typically favored by interest groups on
both the right and the left. Congress has the right and authority to be
unwise. It is not constitutionally or ethically compelled to establish a
pragmatically effective system of regulatory review.
If everyone affected is happy with judicial review, why rock the
boat? Indeed, some might argue that prevailing satisfaction with
judicial review is a sufficient pragmatic defense of the process and
calls into question Part H's conclusions on its pathological
consequences. However, the reasons why Congress and many
affected parties favor the disruptions caused by judicial review are
illegitimate.
A. Why Congress and the Executive Illegitimately Favor Judicial
Review
To begin with Congress, it seems a fair question to ask why
Congress would favor judicial review of administrative action. While
such review serves to check the competing executive branch, it may
also undermine the power of Congress, especially to the extent that it
obstructs achievement of the goals of the legislation Congress passes.
Judicial review is a transfer of power from both the executive branch
and Congress to the judiciary. Why would Congress acquiesce to
such a loss of power?
Congressional devotion to judicial review can be explained
readily as part of legislators' attempt to escape from electoral
accountability. Individual congresspersons have policy goals, but also
are highly concerned with reelection.26' An individual legislator's
chances of winning reelection are enhanced by taking actions that
have (or appear to have) positive consequences for which the
legislator may take credit and by avoiding blame for any negative
consequences of the action. However, such actions evade
accountability. In the real world, few, if any policies have only
positive consequences. This is particularly true in the regulatory
context, where laws are intended to offer some public benefit, but
inevitably impose direct costs on the regulated entity and indirect
costs on society as a whole. Some commentators suggest that
regulatory statutes, by their nature, seek to escape accountability-
"[a]s generally stated intentions to do something, they placate the
261. See generally DAVM R. MAYHEW, CONGRESs: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
57-73 (1974) (discussing the electoral incentive to take credit and avoid blame).
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public, yet at the same time they provide latitude for administrators
to do." 62
Congress can claim to have addressed a problem through
regulatory statutes while escaping any negative consequences of the
legislation (and blaming other branches for any failure of the
legislation to solve the problem). In the end, legislators thus escape
blame for negative consequences. They also can escape retribution
from regulated groups that disfavor action while taking credit from
the public that seeks the action. Consequently, some legislators are
able to posture with concern for a problem that they do not sincerely
care to address. The strategy works because the general citizenry
does not appreciate the inescapable pragmatic significance of
procedural statutory detail.263
Of course, Congress cannot count on the executive branch to "do
nothing," especially in the presence of a broad public demand for
action. An activist President might seek to regulate aggressively and
accept the consequences of such action. Regulated groups may not
be a key part of the President's constituency, and Presidents are term-
limited and consequently have less concern for reelection. The
actions of such a President could force legislators to accept the real-
world consequences of their legislation or, at least, to make hard
choices in new legislation to restrict the regulation. At this point,
judicial review intervenes to obstruct the efforts of such a President
and keep the legislation largely symbolic 26 Mark Graber observes
that "[e]lected officials in the United States encourage or tacitly
support judicial policymaking both as a means of avoiding political
responsibility for making tough decisions and as a means of pursuing
controversial policy goals that they cannot publicly advance through
open legislative and electoral politics." 65 In the case of the Clean Air
Act, for example, judicial review has caused EPA to set "stringent
standards while backing down on enforcement deadlines," which "has
helped turn national standards into long-range goals, as opposed to
262. WEST, supra note 30, at 27.
263. See CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DESIGNING JUDICIAL REVIEW: INTEREST GROUPS,
CONGRESS, AND COMMUNICATION POLICY 16 (1997). As Shipan explains, "[m]ost
constituents do not consider the political battles over procedural details to be important"
and "pay little, if any, attention to these battles." Id. For interest groups, however, "these
battles are of central consequence." Id
264. See Kerwin, supra note 71, at 356 (observing that Congress creates procedural
requirements for agencies so it can "influence the process and to protect special interests
without being held responsible for the content of individual rules").
265. Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 35,37 (1993).
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legally binding requirements."2" Congressional provision of judicial
review thus can "be recognized as an attempt to pass the buck for
addressing the problems that have surfaced with the regulatory
process to the courts-without charging both political branches of the
federal government to take greater responsibility for the manner in
which society's resources are allocated through regulatory
decisions."267
Legislators not only seek to evade accountability for potentially
unpopular regulation, but also seek to attend to the influence of
regulated interests. Judicial review of rulemaking is structurally
obstructive of government action and strongly in the interest of these
regulated entities. The APA itself was passed at the behest of
conservatives seeking to undermine the New Deal.268 Business
interests supported the APA because they "understood fully that the
APA could become a central tool for delaying, if not completely
frustrating an activist government."26 9  Judicial review has always
been favored by powerful special interests who can use the courts to
frustrate regulatory action. 70 Judicial review enables Congress to
pass statutes in response to public demand, yet defang any serious
threat to regulated entities.
From the perspective of the legislator, the ideal self-interested
action is symbolic legislative actionY' Through symbolic legislation,
Congress can take a publicized legislative stand for a popular end,
such as a clean environment, while escaping the consequences of the
costs of such regulation.272 Congress, therefore, may favor judicial
266. MELNICK, supra note 38, at 295.
267. ROBERT E. LITAN & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL
REGULATION 115 (1983).
268. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 1, at 1285-88 (arguing that the APA was the product of
antiregulatory forces); Matthew McCubbins et al., The Political Origins of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 209-13 (1999) (describing how
the APA was the design of antiregulatory forces and setting forth votes as evidence);
George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1557 passim (1996) (closely analyzing the
history of the Act's passage).
269. PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TIDES OF REFORM: MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK, 1945-
1995, at 68 (1997).
270. See Cross, supra note 1, at 1315-26.
271. See, e.g., Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process
or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 46-52 (1982) (describing how Congress
creates vague legislative commands in order to escape accountability for consequences);
Kagan, supra note 196, at 383 (observing that "politicians appease the electorate by
enacting well-publicized regulatory legislation, while subsequently starving enforcement
agencies of the resources needed to implement the laws forcefully").
272. Graber suggests that "mainstream politicians may facilitate judicial policymaking
[Vol. 781060
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF R ULEMAKING
review precisely because review renders Congress's own statutes less
effective 73 The legislators thereby get credit for taking action, can
shift the blame for implementation shortcomings and escape the
blame potentially associated with the costs of effective
implementationz 4  In the end, legislators avoid making hard
decisions and appear to be a "friend to all."' 75 Congresspersons give
federal agencies "huge, even utopian, goals," but saddle them with "a
large number of constraints that prevent them from achieving these
goals efficiently-or even at all. '276 While this is perfectly rational
from the viewpoint of a legislator seeking reelection, the approach is
an illegitimate effort to escape the duty to legislate and be held
accountable for the consequences of legislation.
This pattern is quite apparent in environmental law, which is
pervaded by symbolic statutes that carry potentially significant real-
world implicationsY7 Politicians strategically embrace unrealistic
goals, such as the elimination of all pollution, but simultaneously
create regulatory roadblocks that restrain even moderate
achievementY8 The symbolic statutory goals themselves create such
roadblocks by encouraging extreme positions in litigation and
in part because they have good reason to believe that the courts will announce those
policies [the politicians] privately favor but cannot openly endorse without endangering
their political support." Graber, supra note 265, at 43; see also EISNER, supra note 91, at
45 (noting that some statutory authorizations are "symbolic efforts designed to assuage the
demands of mobilized constituents").
273. See WILSON, supra note 33, at 242 (noting that the result of congressional
"structural and procedural arrangements ... has been the creation of bureaucratic
organizations that cannot function effectively").
274. See, e.g., DAvID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECrORAL CONNECrION 62
(1974) (referring to the legislative art of making "pleasing judgmental statements" without
having to actually produce action on difficult issues); Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note
50, at 293 (observing that "Congress can satisfy its environmental consumer constituents
by enacting legislation, [and] it may then be able to satisfy its regulated-interests
constituency through lax implementation," which can be accomplished by "ensuring that
the regulatory process grinds slowly"); David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy, A
Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 740 (1999) (observing that Congress
delegates in order "to claim much of the credit for the benefits of the laws but shift to the
unelected agency officials much of the blame for the inevitable costs and disappointments
when the agency fails to deliver all the benefits promised").
275. Smith, supra note 141, at 456.
276. R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 245,257 (1992).
277. See generally Dwyer, supra note 145, passim (describing the hazards involved with
symbolic legislation, focusing on section 112 of the Clean Air Act).
27& See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECr ALTERNATIVES 96 (1994) (describing how a
"politician may declare an abiding concern for the environment and even support broad
(albeit vague) legislation and at the same time block implementation ... under the guise
of some procedural or jurisdictional rationale").
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polarizing interested parties in a manner that prevents an effective
compromise solution. The encouragement of symbolic congressional
action creates another substantial problem by overpromising results,
raising the public's expectations unrealistically and undermining more
moderate and effective action. The misperceptions created by overly
broad environmental statutes "pose a most serious obstacle to
environmental policy reform."2 79
The original adoption of the APA itself reflects this
congressional attempt to escape accountability through symbolic
legislation. The Act was passed with, and still includes, very
ambiguous language regarding the scope of judicial review, leaving
some commentators to conclude that "instead of agreeing on specific
provisions, the parties agreed to a game of roulette in which the
courts [spin] the wheel." 0 The losing party then can "blame the
unfavorable outcome on loose-cannon, activist courts."'' 1 Through
the fiction of legalism, legislative responsibility is displaced, and
democracy is corroded.m When Congress actually disapproves of an
unpopular agency policy, it can use its oversight authority as pressure
for modification.m But judicial review means that Congress need not
be accountable for weakening popular agency policies, leaving it to
the courts to frustrate their effects.2 4
279. Fred L. Smith, Jr., Conclusion" Environmental Policy at the Crossroads, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS, supra note 224, at 177,
178; see also Bradley C. Bobertz, Transferring the Blame, ENVTL. FORUM, Jan./Feb. 1996,
at 23, 23 (complaining that "the fact that we deal harshly with culturally accepted symbols
of environmental problems makes it less likely that we will deal with the problems-and
their causes-themselves").
280. Shepherd, supra note 268, at 1665.
281. Id.
282. See SMrrH, supra note 38, at 23 (noting how reliance on judicial policymaking
undermines democracy at the legislative level and renders the public "passive, apathetic,
and deferential" to judicial decisionmaking).
283. See Cross, supra note 1, at 1294-97 (discussing congressional checking of
agencies).
284. An interesting natural experiment demonstrating this effect was noted in
Schoenbrod, supra note 274, at 731. He writes:
Congress has recently provided us with a laboratory experiment to see if
legislators are willing to step forward to repeal agency laws with which they
disagree. In the name of congressional responsibility, Congress enacted the
Congressional Review Act, which sets up expedited procedures for floor votes to
repeal new agency laws before they go into effect. In the first eighteen months of
this procedure, agencies promulgated thousands of regulations, many of which
have been criticized by legislators. But the Senate voted on only one of them,
and the House on none. The experiment shows that legislators react to
responsibility as vampires do to garlic-they flee.
Id. at 739.
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In addition to the illegitimate attempts to escape from
accountability, judicial review is sometimes prompted by democratic
shortcomings within Congress itself. Judicial review fails to promote
the intent of Congress as a whole; instead it advances the goals of
certain key committees and their staffs.2 5  When judicial review
considers legislative history, it empowers a "relatively few
individuals" on "committees and their staffs." 6 These individuals
exercise their control and influence judicial review through a
"carefully placed phrase in the legislative history or committee
reports, [or] a stealthy insertion into the congressional record,"
thereby giving themselves disproportionate control over the discrete
policy areas in which they are most interested.2  The undue power of
individual members and their staffs is magnified because
congressional efforts to check the courts and modify decisions
through legislative action must pass through the committee system.28
This is strategic behavior by the key drafters of legislation, but there
is no democratically principled basis for empowering a small minority
of Congress (or their appointed agents), when the alternative is
empowering the agents of the Executive, who represents the entire
nation.
One might expect the executive branch to resist judicial review,
much as President Franklin D. Roosevelt fought the predecessors to
the APA and the Clinton Administration fought judicial review
provisions in more recent regulatory reform bills.289 However, the
executive branch has relatively little power to resist some such
review, given the established existence of the APA and congressional
lawmaking powers. Moreover, the executive branch may itself
become complicitous, relying on judicial review to escape
accountability for its own difficult administrative decisions.29° Judges,
285. See MELNICK, supra note 38, at 112 (describing how the PSD decision "enhanced
the power of already powerful committee members and their staffs"). A review of the
Clean Air Act experience found "many examples of court-committee symbiosis," enabling
committees and subcommittees to "push the programs of special interest to them." I& at
376-77; see also James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges
Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 14 (1994) (noting that judicial
search for statutory interpretation empowers a "handful of legislators" or authors of
committee reports).
286. LANDY ET AL., supra note 21, at 287.
287. SHIPAN, supra note 263, at 19.
288. See John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEo. L.J. 565, 576-77 (1992) (describing the effect of congressional
committees on legislative responses to court rulings).
289. See Sunstein, supra note 228, at 271.
290. See Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent
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largely freed from accountability concerns by life tenure, are happy to
accept this decisionmaking power. Government institutions thus
conspire to establish judicial review, even when it is
counterproductive.
B. Why Even Public Interest Groups Illegitimately Favor Judicial
Review
Private organizations provide no counterbalance to this
government institutional bias. Given the consequences of judicial
review of administrative action, it is obvious why regulated entities
favor it. The procedural complexity of judicial review has been
characterized as "a legislative bone thrown to the unsuccessful
opponents of regulatory legislation."2 91 Litigation stalls, obstructs,
and deters costly regulatory action. Antiregulatory parties are well
aware of how judicial review provisions can enable them to subvert
legislative goals. 29  A detailed case study of communications
legislation reveals how interested parties fought extensively over
apparently arcane procedural judicial review provisions that had
favorable substantive implications 93 A Congress already amenable
to procedural requirements is influenced by major contributors to
introduce favorable judicial review provisions. Meanwhile, the
general public has difficulty mobilizing to oppose this influence and
may be satisfied by the general symbolic proclamations of action
because it is unaware that the substance of the legislation is
undermined by procedural requirements.
One might wonder why pro-regulatory groups, such as
environmental activist groups, also seem to favor judicial review.294
Once again, there are rational, if politically illegitimate, reasons for
Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal
Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203,273 (1987) (observing how "the Reagan appointees at
EPA found it far more convenient to hide behind the constraints of [a Clean Water Act]
consent agreement than to make this decision on their own authority").
291. MASHAW, supra note 34, at 185.
292. See Charles R. Shipan, Interest Groups, Judicial Review, and the Origins of
Broadcast Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 549, 553 (1997) (observing that "interest groups
know which types of provisions are most likely to help them achieve their goals and
pressure members of Congress to write such provisions into law").
293. See SHIPAN, supra note 263,passim.
294. Of course, there is always the possibility that pro-regulatory groups simply
misunderstand the consequences of judicial review. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. WEST,
CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACY 60 (1995) (suggesting that public interest groups
unwisely favored aggressive judicial review of Federal Trade Commission action because
"they apparently failed to appreciate ... that the context of consumer protection had
changed to one of promoting policy change").
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this position. It is a mistake to believe that all environmental groups
are uniformly interested in the protection of the general environment
or public health.295 Most groups have their favored environmental
subissues on which they focus. For example, the Sierra Club initiated
the litigation producing the prevention of significant deterioration
(PSD) program out of concern for protecting pristine areas, even
though the program's effect was to increase environmental problems
in more populated areas.2 96  The PSD program prohibited
degradation of ambient air quality in parts of the country that were
already well inside the range of compliance for federal standards. It
had an environmental benefit in these geographic areas, but its net
environmental effect was negative.29 As this example demonstrates,
judicial review is an opportunity to advance a group's particularized
agenda, even when advancement comes at the expense of the goals of
other groups. In other words, a group that is especially interested in
the regulation of radionuclides will benefit from a court order
commanding such regulation, even if the effect of the order is to
preclude other more important environmental regulations2 9
Similarly, the AFL-CIO has petitioned in court for regulation of
relatively small worker hazards while ignoring "some of the most
severe hazards ... apparently because the workers most affected are
not generally unionized."2 99
In addition to seeing court action as a means of furthering a
favored, narrow policy objective, public interest groups also may have
institutional motivations for favoring judicial review.30  This
narrowed focus may be a natural consequence of competition among
public interest groups. In a crowded field, a group can differentiate
itself by specializing in a particular issue of concern to a potential
constituency. Once expertise in a narrow area is established, it may
295. See Rabkin & Devins, supra note 290, at 274 (noting that "public interest groups,
however well-meaning or sincere, may frequently be captivated by highly partisan or
highly parochial perspectives on public policy").
296. See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 407,
438 (1990) (observing that the effect of the PSD decision was to "perpetuate the existence
of old, particularly dirty producers in New York," and concluding that the "foreclosure of
new risks has thus increased the magnitude of old ones").
297. See Greve, supra note 224, at 112 (observing that "[e]ven the best-intentioned
private enforcers will invariably be guided by the costs and benefits of litigation to
themselves, not to society").
29& See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
299. RABKIN, supra note 39, at 235.
300. See Rossi, supra note 67, at 219 (observing that environmental interest groups are
"guided by the immediate costs and benefits of litigation to themselves, not by the public
benefit of their action").
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become self-perpetuating, as the public interest group gains a
trademark reputation of sorts in the area. That reputation may
enhance the group's policy clout, which in turn presumably enhances
its fundraising abilities. Like Congress, such groups have reason to
favor symbolic action and judicial review in furtherance of symbolic
victories.30' Participating in judicial review gives some groups a
reason for existence and a justification for considerable fundraising.3°
Public interest groups can seek money in order to bring additional
litigation and to counteract the efforts of industry in court. An
occasional success in court can be trumpeted in future fundraising
appeals as evidence of the group's efficacy and importance, regardless
of the functional consequences of the case. Moreover, successful
litigation can result in lucrative legal fee awards for interest groups
with their own attorneys.30 3 Even ineffective judicial review can assist
fundraising efforts, because failures may be used to demonstrate the
need for more money. Public interest groups also can use judicial
review to establish political relationships, even at the expense of the
group's objectives.3° Accordingly, judicial review of regulation can
help environmental groups, for example, at the same time that it
undermines the objectives of environmental protection statutes.0 5
301. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 164, at 25 (noting that a successful
lawsuit can "yield a palpable sense of victory for both the environmental lawyer and his
clients," though such litigation consequentially "obscures as much as it instructs"); Ayres
& Braithwaite, supra note 74, at 465 (reporting that nongovernment organizations may
"focus on deriving satisfaction from symbolic victories"); Perritt, supra note 236, at 1641
(noting that public interest groups may "prefer short term litigation victories," because the
"publicity associated with a dramatic victory and extreme statements made in litigation
tend to facilitate fund raising and other facets of membership support").
302. See, e.g., RABKIN, supra note 39, at 29-31 (suggesting that public interest groups
can have strong incentives for striking defiant postures against government agencies or
policies, even when such posturing has little or no effect on the government's position).
The AFL-CIO, for example, fought for a standard on ethylene oxide in order to help it
"expand unionization in a traditionally nonunionized field." Id. at 235; Lazarus, supra
note 100, at 334 (noting that the "filing of lawsuits also provided environmentalists with
media events that provided publicity for their cause and incidentally aided fundraising
efforts"); see also Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 74, at 465 (observing that adversarial
conflict may help private organizations increase financial contributions and membership).
303. See JONATHAN ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS 45 (1995).
In 1987, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) received over $600,000 in legal
fees from the federal government. See id.
304. See RABKIN, supra note 39, at 180 (noting that the Legal Defense Fund pursued
litigation against the Office of Civil Rights that was "pushing race discrimination issues to
the margins," because the process "enhanced its coalition with women's groups and with
advocates for the handicapped").
305. Perhaps this public choice vision is unfair, and perhaps public interest groups
sincerely believe that judicial review will enhance the public objectives of government
regulation so that court intervention can be transformed from a brake into an accelerator.
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Even if a decision preventing states from granting Clean Air Act
variances has the effect of harming the environment, it can sound like
progress in fundraising literature. Moreover, public interest groups
may pursue short-term victories even at the expense of long-run
losses, if the short-term victories can be played up.
30 6
Because of policy and financial motivations, public interest
groups have a vested interest in judicial review. Mark Tushnet has
observed that "[p]eople with vested interests in using the courts to
challenge official action-public interest law firms of the left and
right-are bound to oppose doing away with judicial review."
3°7
Ultimately, judicial review is a self-interested bargain between
Congress and special interest groups (and perhaps the executive and
judicial branches). All have their interests served, but judicial review
does not serve the public interest. This result is unsurprising. Mancur
Olson's classic theory of collective action proposes that the diffuse
interests of the general public will suffer before the interests of
narrower collectivities.0 8
C. How Judicial Review Has Become a Lose-Lose Proposition for
the Public
Perhaps the best and most coherent defense of judicial review of
administrative action would involve the frank concession that in the
course of advancing special interests, such review effectively obstructs
regulation and that such obstruction is a good thing. Conservatives
could argue that we should structure institutions so as to make
regulation especially difficult. Certainly, ample evidence
demonstrates that many regulations are unnecessary, expensive, or
even counterproductive. From some public choice perspectives,
judicial review might be the ideal tool to restrain unwise regulation
while still assuaging public demands for government action. Of
course, our Constitution does not necessarily call for the most
If so, their position is historically weak, and such a transformation is "spectacularly
unlikely given our political traditions." Jerry Mashaw, Imagining the Past; Remembering
the Future, 41 DUKE L.J. 711, 717 (1991).
306. See Brett McDonnell, Dynamic Statutory Interpretations and Sluggish Social
Movements, 85 CAL. L. REV. 919, 920 (1997).
307. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 155
(1999).
308. The classic exposition of the theory is in MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECrIVE ACTION passim (1965). The theory suggests that smaller groups will be
better able to organize because of extreme free rider problems associated with large
groups. For a concise summary of the theory, see Frank B. Cross, The Role of Lawyers in
Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution, 45 EMORY L.. 523,528-32 (1996).
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efficient approach, especially when that approach would contravene
democracy. Nevertheless, the argument against regulation should be
made on its merits, not in back-door procedural deals. Moreover,
judicial review may be unjustifiable, even under this restraint of
regulation standard, for several reasons.
First, a considerable body of regulation is already in place.
Judicial review may now be more likely to frustrate deregulation than
to limit regulation in the first place. 9 Private interest groups have
their own interests in preventing deregulation. When the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) sought to deregulate transportation,
the "trucking industry complained bitterly about the 'lawlessness' of
deregulatory initiatives by ICC and used litigation (and the threat of
more litigation) to slow the pace of moves toward greater competition
during the 1980s. ''310 Analogously, slowing the pace of regulation also
slows regulatory approvals; for example, FDA resources dedicated to
meeting judicial requirements were drawn from the processing of new
drugs, many of which promised considerable therapeutic benefits.311
The public, therefore, has been harmed by the slowed access to new
treatment possibilities. However, the manufacturers of existing drugs
benefit when potential competitors are prevented from entering the
marketplace in a timely fashion. Judicial review thus may benefit
industry groups even at the expense of overall efficiency.
Second, while judicial review reduces the overall quantity of
regulation, review may perversely make the surviving regulations
much more inefficient and burdensome. As noted above, litigation
sometimes drives administrative decisions to relatively extreme
positions. In addition, the increased administrative process
requirements of the APA have made decisions overly legalistic and
have "shut out any room for" governmental accountability.312 Judicial
review also may have prevented agencies from revisiting rules and
improving them.3  While the Clean Air Act mandates periodic
review and revision of national ambient air quality standards every
309. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARv. L. REV. 507,
540 (1985) (observing that "agencies are finding a substantial percentage of their
deregulatory decisions overturned for failure to pass the 'arbitrary and capricious' test").
310. RABKIN, supra note 39, at 91.
311. See Cross, supra note 107, at 885 (discussing the benefit derived from FDA new-
drug approvals).
312. Howard, supra note 179, at 315-16.
313. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMiN. L. REV. 363, 393 n.93 (1986) (criticizing NHTSA for leaving in place an
ineffective safety standard because it could not obtain agreement from interested parties
and hence feared judicial review of any modification).
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five years, for instance, EPA consistently has failed to conduct such
reviews and, when rules are revised, the agency "tends to set the
standard at or near existing levels, in part because of the difficulty of
justifying any departures from the status quo. ' 314 This consequence, a
reluctance to revisit and improve rules, "may disserve both regulatees
and regulatory beneficiaries. '315  The inherently cautious and
legalistic response required by judicial review also frustrates
innovative, efficient regulatory approaches. 6 This effect makes
regulation costlier and less effective.
At this point, of course, APA judicial review of administrative
rulemaking is well established and seldom challenged. It is time to
change this blithe acceptance, to scrutinize the consequences of
judicial review, and to ask whether they make sense, either as a
matter of pragmatic consequence or as a system of governance. If, as
I contend, judicial review has pathological consequences for
government, it should be eliminated.
CONCLUSION
While judicial review of administrative rulemaking is often
regarded as a largely procedural matter, its substantive consequences
are enormous. Unfortunately, when analyzing the proper scope of
administrative law, such consequences typically are overlooked or at
least downplayed. Yet given the purposes of regulation, the
consequences of judicial review should be at the forefront of our legal
and policy analysis. Examination of those consequences
demonstrates the perversity of judicial review of administrative rules,
a pathology grounded in the institutional illegitimacy of the review
process itself.
314. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying," supra note 20, at 1390-91.
315. Id. at 1391.
316. See supra notes 221-38 and accompanying text.
317. See Cross, supra note 1, passim (discussing the failure of judicial self-restraint and
the need for abolition of judicial review).
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